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IlIBRARY OF CONGRESS. I 

! UNITED STATES OP AMERICA. # 



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!?( ACCOUIT OF THE OPERATIONS 



FIFTH ARMY CORPS 



COMMANDED BY MAJ.-GEK G. K. WARREN 



BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS 

APRIL 1, 1865, 



BATTLES AND MOVEMENTS PRELIMINARY TO IT. 



LATE MAJOR-GENERAL VOLUNTEERS 




NEW YORK: 

D. VAN NOSTRAND, 

192 Broadway. 

1806. 



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INTRODUCTION. 



The f'oiifidence sliown bv the Coinmander-in-Chief in se- 
leeting me for the command of the Department of Mississippi, 
then tlie theater of actual warfare, immediately after the bat- 
tle of Five Forks. I deemed a thorough vindication of my 
conduct on that memorable occasion. 

I felt, thoug-h denied the official investigation which I had 
'applied for, that I could leave my justification before the 
])ublic to the ultimate publication of the official reports. I 
trusted, voo, that Ge]i. Sheridan's report would do u\e justice, 
and that he could not fail in it to acknowledge that his treat- 
ment of me M'as hasty and based on erroneous impressions. 
The publication of this report, dated May 16, in the Official 
Gazette, disappointed this hope, for therein, as far as mention 
is made of me, it is in terms of disparagement and in efi'orts to 
jnstity his inconsiderate action. 

After this publication I thought the investigation I sought 
could not long be denied, and I have remained silent till now, 
fully believing an im]^artial investigation would relieve me 
of the imputations of Gen. Sheridan, and place just censure on 
those by whom I have been wronged. 

To bring my professional grievances before the public is a 
thing from which I have shrunk, and I do not do so now from 
any love of controversy. If circumstances were different I 
sliould be g]ad to avoid it; luit the facts being little known 
and understood, and there being many misrepresentations, I 
am under this necessity. I have, therefore, pi'epared the follow- 
ing narrative of facts in much detail, so that each one can ex- 
amine and judge for himself, as, I presume, all fair-minded 
men, whose time will permit, will gladly do. 

In the report* of Gen. Sheridan there are three ini[)utations 



* Extracts from this report, giving all that relates to me, are placed in the ap- 
pendix to this narrative. 



4 INTRODrCTION. 

ajyaiiist me — tlie^/'^^of wliicli, is vaguely made, in the follow- 



\nQ- : 



" llad Gen. AVarren moved according to tlie expectations 
" of tlie Lieutenant-General, there would appear to have been 
" but little chance for the escape of the enemy's infantry in 
'^ front of Dinwiddie C. H/' 

If snc]i expectations -were formed, they were not reasona- 
ble, acoording to the facts. I acted durino; the nig-ht under 
orders from Gen. Meade, which, Avith my dispatches to him, 
and other facts, Avill be given. It will appear that the enemy 
lield all the roads necessary for his escape ; that he withdrew' 
from Gen. Sheridan's front to Five Foi-ks early in the night,- 
and that the swollen state of Gravelly Run and a broken bridge 
prevented my troops from reaching Gen. Sheridan till day- 
break. It also wdll appear that the tenor of my orders from 
Gen. Meade were not that I was to prevent the escape of the 
enemy, but to use every exertion to succor Gen. Sheridan, 
who could ''not maintain himself at DinwicMie C. H. without 
''reinforcements:' My dis]iatches show that it was my own 
suggestion to attempt to intercept the enemy if he remained 
in Gen. Sheridan's front, and not fall back, as I was at first 
ordered. 

The second imputation is contained in the following: 

" Gen. Warren did not exert himself to get up his Corps 
" as rapidly as he might have done, and his manner gave me 
" the impression that he wished the sun to go down before dis- 
" positions for the attack could be completed." 

The facts of tlie movements of the troops in coming up to 
this point are all given in the statements of Brevet Brig.-Gen. 
Bankliead, who carried my order to tlie troops to niove up 
Avliile I ]-ode forward to examine the ground on which they 
Avere to form ; and in the letters of Generals Crawford, Gritlin, 
and Ay res, who commanded my three divisions. I present 
them here in their proper place in the narrative, and they are 
conclusive that I and my troops exerted ourselves to form for 
the attack as rapidly as possible. 



INTRODrCTION. 5 

While tlie troopB were forming I [\M Gen. Slieridaii it 
would of-eupy till 4 p. m., at wliicli time tliev. ("/vyv formed, and 
at which time the snn was fa-o and a half /iou/\s' lihjli. Cer- 
tainly I could not haye expected the snn to go dow ii before 
the " dispositions for the attack conld be comj^leted,'' nor haye 
giyen him reason to think I Avished it. I had at the time con- 
iidence in the success of our proposed attack, and tlie kindest 
feelino-s toward Gen. Sheridan, under wliom I was glad to 
serye. I am utterly at a loss to account for the misapprehen- 
sion lie labored under in imputing such baseness to me, and I 
trust mj conduct throughout the war lias shown to those l)y 
whom I am best known that I am incapable of it. 

The tlih'd imputation is contained in the following: 

"• During this engagement portions of his line gaye wa_y 
" when not exjDosed to a heayy tire, and simply from want of 
" confidence on the part of the troops, which Gen. Warren did 
" not exert himself to inspire." 

I had, at the time of the engagement, to control the moye- 
ments of an entire Gorpn dhirmee^ fighting and changing front 
as it adyanced through the forests. It is clearly a case for the 
exercise of a corps conimander''s judgment, liow far he shall at 
any time giye his personal ettbrts to the general contrtd of liis 
corps, or assist his subordinate commanders in their connnands, 
and whether he shall use his staff and himself to rally troops 
who bi'cak under a not yery seyere fire, from want of confi- 
dence, or to so direct other poi'tions of his connnand as to 
thereby remedy the eyil which this giying way produced. 
Whateyer is yital to the success of the whole is the thing de- 
serving the corps commander's attention, and to that, through- 
out, I gaye mine. On account of the forest Gen. Sheridan 
saw but one flank of the operations of my command, and was 
no further cognizant of my exertions. He saw nothing of the 
fiffhtino; of Gen. Crawford's division, which suffered more from 
the enemy's fire 'than any other. There was no part of my 
command that did not witness my exertions at one time or 
another, and my horse was fatally shot close to the enemy's 
breastworks. To those who served under me I refer for proof 
of my exertions, and, as they represent every section of our 



f) INTROmiCTIOX. 

* 

coiiiitrv, any one who wishes can verify nij assertion by those 
aronnd liini. 

If Gen. Sheridan liad stated wliicli of my troops niisbe- 
liaved for want of my presence, I couhl bring the evidence of 
their commander to hear in my defense. But liow this exer- 
tion could have been specially required of me I am at loss to 
nndei-SLand; for he says himself, " I cannot speak too highly 
" of the t:'oops in this battle and the gallantry of their com- 
" manders.'" 

The duty of every soldier to obey has its correlative which 
entitles him to the protection of those under whom he serves, 
and this I have been denied. 

Gen. Sheridan says : 

" I therefore I'elieved him from the command of the Fifth 
" Coros, authority for this action having been sent to me 
" before the battle, unsolic'ted." 

From the time that authority reached him he, ap])arently, 
sought occasion to use it. I say this Math regret ; but the 
tone of the report toward me, and his hasty action, indicate 
that it was so. If a victory won by my command, under my 
direction, could not gain me credit, where the plans made 
were, as he says, " successfiiUy e'xecuted^' and where my efforts 
and directions were known to almost every one, then nothing 
could. 

Gen. Grant, while giving the above authority to Gen. 
Sheridan, had never signified to me, in the remotest manner, 
any dissatisi'action Avith me. I had had no direct official 
relations with him. My instructions all came through Gen. 
Meade, and to him all my reports were made. If Gen. Grant 
had ever expressed himself displeased wnth me to Gen. Meade, 
tlie latter had kept it from me; and he ever showed, l)y 
entrusting to me the advan^^e of the army on many vital 
occasions, and often hy sending me on detached expeditious, 
the highest confidence in me, and this is well known. 

I shall further reply to the imputations of Gen. Sheridan 
while giving the narration of the events to which they relate, 
which narration, I hope, will possess an interest of its own, 
independent of its defense of me. 



lARRATIVE. 



In order to introduce the Lattleof Five P'orks intelligently, 
I M'ill iirst describe tlie previons operations of March 29tli, 
30th, and Slst, and shall do so bnt briefly, in order to confine 
attention particnlarly to the 1st of April and the orders of the 
night before. 

My conmiand, on March 29th, consisted of Gen, Crawford's 
Division, five thonsaiid two hnndred and fifty strong ; Gen. 
Griffin's Division, six thousand one hnndred and eighty strong • 
and Gen. Ayres" Division, three thousand nine hundred and 
eighty strong. I took with me, as directed, only five fonr-gun 
batteries, under Gen. AV^aiuAvright. I had no cavalry, exce})t 
an escort of forty men, under Capt. Ilorrell. 

All the ca\'alry of the jd'niy, except headquarter escorts, 
was with Gen. Sheridan, whose o])erations were to be so 
distinct from mine that I M'as ordered to act enth-ely inde- 
pendent of any protection he could give my flanks. My 
position throughout was on the left flank of tlie infantry and 
artillery, army of Gen, Meade. 

To facilitate the understanding of the subject, I have added 
to my narrative a reliable map, on a scale of one mile to an 
inch. The region represented is of tlie character connnon in 
Virginia, level, much covered with thick and tangled woods, 
and well watered by numerous small, swampy streams. The 
soil was clayey or sandy, which, when commingled in wet 
places, partakes of the nature of 'Npiick-sand," and where, 
uplieaved by the winter frosts that now had left it, presented 
little less support to wheels or hoofs than would a bank of 
snow, 

I enumerate here th(? officers of my staf^', not merely l)ecaiise 
it is due to them Avhenever the operations of the Fifth Army 



8 BATTLE OF QCAKEE KOAD. 

Corps are considered, but also to point out tliose to wliom any 
one can specially refer for the correctness of what I write. 
This statf has probably had as much experience in the actual 
\varfare as any other that could be named. It consisted of 
Col. II. C. Bankhead, Inspector-General, and Major "VVm. T. 
Gentry, Commissary of Musters, both graduates of the United 
States Military Academy ; of Col. F. T. Locke, Adjutant- 
General, which position he had held from the organization of 
the corps, in May, 1862 ; of Col. A. L. Thomas, Cliief Quarter- 
master ; of Col. D. L. Smith, Chief Conmiissary of Sid:)sistence ; 
of Col. R. C. Spencer, Medical Director ; of Dr. Chas. K. 
AVinne, Medical Inspector ; and of Capt. Malvern, Chief Ambu- 
lance Officer. To these, for the time, was added Capt. AVm. 
H. H. Be^yaurd, of the Regular Engineers, detached from 
Gen. Meade's staff to accompany me, and who gave me most 
important assistance, as also did Major Van Bokkelen, of the 
Volunteer Engineer Brigade, who joined us with a light 
(canvas pontoon train. My personal aides-de-camp were 
Major E. B. Cope, a most valuable topographical officer; 
Capt. James S. Wadsworth, son of the lamented Gen. James 
S. Wadsworth ; and Capt. Gordon Winslow, son of the like 
lamented Hev. Gordon Winslow. 

BATTLE OF QUAKER ROAD. 

We left our camp, in rear of the lines at Petersburg, at 
three a. m., on March 29th. We moved south, across 
Rowanty Creek, below the junction of Gravelly and Hatcher's 
Run, took the road thence to Dinwiddle C. H., as far as the 
Quaker Road, then turned up this latter, and crossed Grav- 
elly Run. 

A sharp engagement took place between a division of the 
enemy and my advance, consisting of Gen. Griffin's Division, 
at the Old Saw-Mill site, in which Gen. Griffin drove the 
enemy back to the junction of the Quaker Road and Bttydton 
Plank-road, intlicting upon him a severe loss, and losing 
himself three hundred and sixty-seven killed and wounded. 

It commenced raining in the night, and continued to do so 
heavily all day on the 30th. During this day, Gen. Griffin's 



BATTLE OF WHITE OAK RIDGE. 9 

line was advanced, Avitli heavv skinnisliiiio- iij) tlie ilo.vdton 
Plank-road, so as to eontiue the enemy, near 15urn;ess' .Mill, to 
his breastworks aloiio- the White Oak Road. A reeoniioissanee 
bv General Ayres' Division was also made, as far west as 
where the enemy's line alon<;- the AVhite Oak Eoad tnrned 
northward to llateher's Run, and our picket line established 
near the White Oak Rido-e. Findino- on i)ersonal examina- 
tion that, though we could sec the road, our pickets did not 
occupj it, I directed tins occupation to be iiuide that evenino-. 

BATTLE OF WHITE OAK RIDGE. 

Toward daylight on March 31st, Gen. GritHu's Division 
was relieved by a portion of the Second Army Corps. At 
7h. 35in. A. M., in answer to a despatch of (ien. Webb, recjuest- 
ing to be informed of the location of my trooi)s, I sent the 
following : 

" Gen. Griffin's troops will be massed near Mrs. Ibitler's, 
" Gen. Ay res near S. Dabney, Gen. Ci'awford about lialf-way 
" between. They are along a wood-road miming from near 
" Mrs. Butler's to W. Dabney 's, on the AVhite Oak Road. It 
" is not practicable now for w heels, and there is a very ditticult 
" branch of Gravelly Run that runs south from the AVhite 
" Oak Ridge, joining the nuuii stream at the crossing of the 
" plank-road, which will take a long time to make ])racticable 
" for wagons. I have all the pioneers I can spare at work on 
" it. I will send you a sketch."' 

It must be noticed here that, at this time, we were (juite 
ignorant of the country I was operating in, aiul the following 
corrections are now necessary in the above des[)atch. The 
place " S. Dabney's " did not exist, though on our ju'iuted 
maps. The place taken for S. Dabney is marked on the uui]t 
"■unknown." The road, instead of joiiuug the White Oak 
Road at W. Dabney's, does so near '' Jiutler's." (Jen. (Ji-iffiirs 
Division was just north of Mrs. Butler's, bnt this name was 
given to indicate the approximate locati<jn on the ma[). 

The s])ace occupied by the trot>ps extended but little 
beyond a mile. Gen. Crawford's Division was in juxtaposition 



10 BATTLE OF WHITE OAK EIDGE. 

Avith Gen. Ayres, and massed ready tu iiglit in any direction. 
Gen. Ayres was cautioned to be prepared to meet the enemy's 
attack both from the north and Avest, and reconnoissances Avere 
beino- made to gain a full knoAvledge of the country. 

At 8h. 4(»m. a. m., I receiA-ed the folloAving dispatch from 
Gen. Wcl.b: 

'' There is hring along Gen. Humphreys' front. The 
" Major-General commanding desires you to be ready to send 
" your reserA'e, if it should be called for to support Gen, 
" HumphreA's. There luill he no movement of troops to-day^ 

To this I at once sent the folloAving reply : 

'' Your dispatch of 8h. 25m. a. m., is just receiA'ed. There 
" is a good deal of musketry tiring going on in our lines, by 
" the men tiring off their guns to put in fresh loads.' Unless 
i' I break loose entirely from Gen. Humphreys, I think the 
" force he sent to relieve Gen. Griffin is much more than, 
" under any circumstances, Avould be needed there. My 
'^ troops are, lioAveA'er, at all times as ready to moA'e as it is 
" possll>le to keep them for a long time. If the enemy break 
'" Gen. Iluniplireys' line at any time, or threaten to do so, I 
" shall not Avait for orders to assist liini, if I can.'' 

At 8h. 5Um. a. m., I received the following from Gen. 
Humphreys : 

" Please let me knoAV Avhcre your right Avill rest, that I 
" may connect Avith you. Gen. Miles has relieved Gen. 
" Griffin, and I tind a vacant spac3 on his left." 

To this I at once replied as folloAvs : 

" I send you a sketch of the country Avest of the plavik- 
" road, and a copy of my communication to Gen. Webb, as to 
" my position. I cannot take up any regular line of battle on 
" account of the Avoods and sAvamps, but have assembled each 
'' division at a point, so they can tight in any direction. I had 
'' a brigade of Gen. Griffin's and a 1)atterv stationed at Stroud's, 
" for support. I don't think your left could be turned (even 
"■ if I moved away) Avithout having full information. But as 



BATTLE OF WHITE OAK EIPGE. 11 

" my troops now are, I could move (Ti-ittin rio-hl up on yum- 
" flank along- witli my artillery. 1 shall W(»rk hard all day to 
" get the road through the woods in order." 

At 8h. 55m. a. m., I received the following from Gen. 
Webb : 

" Owing to the weather, no change will to-day be made in 
" the present position of the troops. Three days' rati(»ns of 
"" subsistence and forage will be brought up and issued to the 
" troops, and the artillery and wagons authorized to accom- 
" pany them. The empty supply wagons will be sent to the 
" rear, to be retilled at the railroad terminus. The Chief 
" Engineer and Cor])s Commanders will use every exertion to 
" make practicable the roads to the rear and connnunications 
" with their several ccanmands." 

At O.-KJ a. m. I sent the following dispatch to Gen. AVebb : 

"I have just received a report from Gen. Ayres that the 
" enemy have their pickets still this side of the AVhite Oak 
" Road, so that their connnunication is continuous along it. I 
"■have sent out word to him to try and drive them off, or de- 
" velop with what force the road is held by them." This oper- 
ation I deemed essentially necessary to the security of our own 
ptosition, and I directed Gen. Ayres to use a brigade, if neces- 
sary, the distance being but a few hundred yards. In answer 
to it I received the following disj^atch from Gen. Webb, writ- 
ten 10.30 a. m. : 

" Your dispatch, giving Gen. Ayres' position, is received ; 
" Gen. Meade directs that should you determine, by your re- 
" connoissance, that you can get possession <.)f the White Oak 
"Road, you are to do so, notwithstanding the orders to sus- 
" pend operations." * 

* Comparison of the preceding dispatclies with the following extract relating 
to the same subject, taken from Lieutenant-General Grant's report to the Sec- 
retary of War, dated July 22, 1865, published with the annual documents, shows 
that Lieut -Gen. Grant must have been misinformed in relation to the reports 
made by me and the orders I received. 

[Extract.] 
"On the morning of the :i 1st, Gen. Warren reported favorably to getting 



12 BATTLE (W WHITE OAK RIDGE. 

Gen. AViiitliroj), Avitli liis brigade of Gen. Ayres' division, 
advanced acfordinuly alxmt half-past 10 a.m., and was re- 
pnlsed, and simnltaneonsly an attack, which had been prepar- 
ing against Gen. Ayres, was made l)y the enemy in heavy 
force, both trom tlie nortli and west, and Gen. Ayres' division 
Avas forced back. Gen. Ayres did all that Mas in his power to 
stav the eneni}'. I hastened toward the point of attack, bnt on 
ari-ivingnear Gen, Crawford's division, it was also falling back, 
and all our eiforts to hold the men in the woods were nnavail- 
ing. Gen. Griffin's line was then f(>rmed along the east bank 
of the Iji'anch of Gravelly linn, with Mink's battery on his 
right, and after some severe fighting the enemy was stopped, 
(xen'ls Crawford and Ayres reformed their troops behind this 
line. Information of these events was sent to Gen. Hum- 
phreys early in their occurrence, and he sent Gen. Miles' divi- 
sion to close the space between his left and Gen. Griffin's right. 
One brigade of this, also, advanced to the attack of the enemy, 
but was at first driven back. 

At 1 p. m. I made the following report to Gen. Webb : 

" Gen. Ayres made an advance with a small force at 10 
" a. m., M'hich the enemy drove back and followed up in heavy 
" force, com])elling both Ayres and Crawford to fall back on 
" Griffin, and, of course, in much confusion. Griffin's troops 
" held the enemy at the Eun west of the Plank-road. Gen. 
" Miles' division " (a brigade of it) " afterward attacked the ene- 
" my and were forced back on my riglit. JMy skirmish line in 
" front of Griffin (most of it) has advanced on my left. 

" I am going to send forward a brigade, supported by all I 
" can get of Crawford and Ayres, and attack, swinging on our 
" right. Arrangements are being made for tins, and it will 

" possession of the White Oak Road, and was directed to do so. To acconiijlish 
"this, he moved with one division instead of his whole corjis." 

It is seen that the operations proposed by me and ordered, were as Gen. 
Meade describes, of tlie nature of a " reconnoissance" onlj', the result of which 
was to determine what should be done. Special arrangement would have to be 
made with Gen. Humphreys if Griffin's division had to be moved up to the point 
where Generals Ayres and Crawford were. The action of the enemj-, however, 
interfered with the plans, as they often did, and produced the resulting opera- 
tions. 



OPERATIONS TO SUCCOR SHERIlDAN. 13 

" take place about 1.45 j). ni., if the enemy does not attack 
" sooner." 

Owine: to some difticultics in crossing- the Run, tliis ad- 
vance, which was thus made with tlie wliole avaihdde corj^s, 
took place a little after the time specified above. Gen. liuin- 
phrey's division, under Gen. Miles, also advanced against the 
enemy about tlie same period on our right, but the movement 
M-as not made in close connection with mine. It is my inten- 
tion to enter more into details when I receive the official re- 
ports of my division commanders. 

At 3.40 p. m. I wrote, from the White Oak Road, the fol- 
lowing dispatch to Gen. Webb : 

" AVe have driven the enemy, I think, into his breastworks. 
"The prisoners report Gen. Lee here to-day, and also that 
" their breastworks are tilled with tro(»]>s. We have prisoners 
"from a portion of Pickett's and Johnson's divisions. 

"Gen. Chamberlain's brigade acted with mucli gallantrv 
" in their advance, capturing nearly the entire Fifty-sixth Vir- 
"ginia Regiment, with its flags." 

We met with but little opposition in this advance, so that 
only this one brigade was earnestly engaged. 

The loss to the cor]ts, in killed and wounded, from the 
morning of March 29tli to the close of the battle of White Oak 
Ridge, was eighteen hundi-ed, and included several distin- 
guished soldiers. 

OPERATIONS TO SUCCOR GEN. SHERIDAN. 

Thus far my operations were inde])endent of those of (tcu. 
Sheridan, but at tliis point they came into direct relation to 
him, and the narrative will l)e given in more detail. It must 
be borne in mind, however, that I acted under (Ten. ]\Ieade's 
orders till daybreak or the morning of April 1. 

About 5 p.m., March 31, while on the White Oak Road, 
I received the following from Gen, Webb, chief of staff: 

" Secure your position, and protect, as well as possible, 
" your left flank. Word has been sent to Sheridan, and it is 
"believed that Sheridan is pushing up. Gen. Humphreys 
" will 1>e ordered to push u]) and to connect with your right. 



14: OPERATIOKS TO srCCOE SHERIDAN. 

" You iiiio-ht, if you think it worth while, pusli a small force 
" clown the White Oak Koad, and try to communicate with 
" Sheridan, but they must take care not to tire into his ad- 
" vance." 

The rattle of musketry could now be heard southwest from 
us, whicli seemed to us to be receding, and which led us to 
think the enemy was driying our cay airy. I then ordered 
Gen. Grithn to send Gen. Bartlett, with his brigade, directly 
across the country, so as to attack the enemy on thetlauk, and 
I sent Major Cope, of my staff, with him. At 5.15 p.m. I re- 
ceiyed the following from Gen. AVebl), which directed what 
before had only been suggested : 

" The Major-General commanding directs that you push a 
"brigade down the AVhite Oak Koad to open it tor Gen. Sher- 
"idan, and support the same if necessary. The tiring is so 
" near that the General presumes that the command will not 
" haye tar to go. The distance you will push out must depend 
" on the circumstances of the moyement and the support you 
" can giye them.'''' 

Thus, at the time when to Gen. Meade it seemed " the tiring 
" is so near," it plainly sounded to us more and more distant, 
indicating that our cayalry was falling back, of which I soon 
had confirmation. 

At 5.50 p. m. I sent the following to Gen. Webb: 

" I haye just seen an othcer and a sergeant from Gen. Sher- 
" idan*'s command, who were cut otf in an attack by the enemy 
" and escaped. From what they say, our cayalry was attacked 
" about noon by cayalry and infantry, and rajndly driyen back, 
"two diyisions — Crook ''s and Deyin's — being engaged. The 
"tiring seemed to recede from me t(t\yard Dinwiddle C. II. I 
"haye sent Gen. Bartlett and my escort in that direction, but 
"I thiid-c they cannot be in time. I hear cannonading that I 
"think is from near Dinwiddie C. II." 

About fj.;><> )). m. I recei\'ed the following from Gen. Weblj : 

"A staif (»thcer of (xen. Merritt's has made a report that 
" the enemy has ]>enetrated bet\yeen Sheridan's main command 
" and your position — this is a portion of Pickett's diyision. 
" Let the force ordered to raoye out the White Oak Road moye 
" doM-n the Boydton Plank Road as promptly as possible.'" 



OPEKATIONS TO SUCCOK SHERIDAN. 15 

The force I had sent under Gen. Bartlett had lu.w heen 
gone an hour, and to recall it would liave re(|uired t\v«i h(.urs 
at least for it to reach the Bovdton Plank Road, and make it 
too late for use before dark. My artillery had all l)een left on 
the Boydton Plank-road on account of the mud, which had 
compelled me to d(.so, and (ien. Grittin had left Brevet Bri'*-.- 
Gen. Pierson there, with three regiments of infantry, of Brevet 
Major-Gen. Bartlett's brigade, to support it. 1 therefore sent 
the following dispatch to (4en. Webb, at O.o<l p. m., whicli ex- 
plained what I did : 

" I have ordered Gen. Pierson, with three reginuMits that 
"are now on the Plank-road, right down toward Dinwiddic 
" C. H. I will let Bartlett work and report result, as it is too 
"late to stop him." 

It was then nearly dark. 

Having reconnoitered tlie enemy's breastworks on the White 
Oak Road, I added the following, concerning them, to my dis- 
patch of 0.30 p. m. : 

" We can see the enemy's Ijreastworks for two miles east 
"along the White Oak Road. If they are well iiiamied they 
" cannot be carried. I am within two hundred yards of where 
" tliey turn off northward from the White Oak Road." 

I then gave direction to secure the position we had gained 
by intrenching, and proceeded, Avith my staff, back about two 
.miles to tlie Boydton Plank-road, at which jdace I could com- 
municate by telegraph with Gen. Meade during the night. 
Gen. Meade's headquarters were distant four and a half miles, 
near where the Vaughan Road crosses Hatcher's Run. (Jen. 
Grant's were near Daluiey's Mill, about four miles from me. 
Gen. Sheridan's at Dinwi<ldie ('. II., distant five and a half 
miles, and separated from me by a stream not fordahle foi- in- 
fantry where it crossed the Boydton Plank-road, and the 
bridge was broken down. (Jen. (Jraiit and (Jen. Meade were 
about ten miles from Gen. Slicridan. 

At 8 p. m. I received the following dis]>atch from (Jen. 
Meade, written 7.30 j). m. : 

" Dispatch from Gen. Sheridan says he was forced back to 
" Dinwiddle C. II. by strong force of cavalry supported by 



16 OPERATIOKS TO SUCCOR SHERIDAN. 

" iiifantiT- Tliis leaves your rear and that of the Second Corps 
"on the Boydton Plank-road open, and Avill require great 
" vigilance on your part. If you have sent the Ijrigade down 
" the Boydton Plank-ruad, it should not go fartJier tlian 
" Gravelly Run, as I don't think it will render any service but 
" to protect your rear." 

Gen. Pierson had been compelled to stop at Gravelly Run 
on account of the swollen stream and broken bridge. 

At 8,20 p. m. I wrote to Gen. Webl): 

"I sent Gen. Bartlett out on the road ♦running from the 
" White Oak Road and left him there. He is nearly down to 
" the crossing of Gravelly Run. This will prevent the enemy 
" communicating by that road to-night. I luive about two reg- 
" iments and the artillery to hold the Plank-road toward Din- 
" widdie C. II. It seems to me the enemy cannot remain be- 
"tweeil me and Dinwiddle C. H. if Sheridan keeps lighting 
" them, and I believe they will have to fall l)ack to the Five 
" Forks. If I have to move to-night I shall leave a good many 
" men who have lost their way. Does Gen. Sheridan still hold 
"Dinwiddle C. H.r' 

At 8.40 p. m. I received, by telegraph, the following^ 
marked confidential, from Gen. Webb : 

" The probability is that we will have to contract our lines 
" to-night. You will be recpiired to hold, if possible, the Boyd" 
" ton Plank-road and to Gravelly Run — Humphreys and Ord 
" along the Run. Be prepared to do this at short notice." 

I regretted exceedingly to see this step foreshadowed, for I 
feared it would have the " morale " of giving a failure to our 
whole movement, as similar orders had done on previous occa- 
sions. It would beside relieve the enemy in front of Sheridan 
from the threatening attitude which my position gave me, and 
I therefore sent the following, by telegraph, at 8.1:0 p. m., to 
Gen. Webb: 

" The line along the Plank-road is very strong. One divi- 
"sion, with my artillery, I think, can hold it, if we are not 
" threatened south of Gravelly Run, east of the Plank-road. 
" Gen. Humphreys and my batteries, I think, could hold this 
" securely, and let lae mom down and attack the enemy at Din- 



OPEKATIONS TO SUCCOR SHERIDAN. 17 

" widdie C. II. on one side and Sheridan on the other. ( )ii ac- 
" count of Bartlett's position tliev (tlie enemy) will have to 
''make a considerable detour to reinforce their troops at that 
" point from the north. Unless (len. Sheridan has been too 
" badly handled, I think we have a chance for an open held 
"tight that should be made use of.'" 

My object was not etfected at once, for at i>.17 p. m. I re- 
ceived the foUow^ing, by telegraph, wjitten l»y Gen. Webb at 
9 p. m. : 

" You will, by direction of the Major-General connnand- 
" ing, draw back at once to your position within the Boydtou 
" Plank-road. Send a division down to Dinwiddie C. II., to 
" report to Gen. Sheridan. This division will go down the 
" Boydton Plank-road. Send Griffin's division. Gen, Ilum- 
" phreys will hold to Mrs. Butler's." 

Whereupon I issued the following order to my command, 
which was sent out 9.35 p. m, : 

"I. Gen. Ayres will inniiediately withdraw his division back 
" to where it was massed yesterday, near the Boydton Plank 
" Koad. 

" II. Gen. Crawford will follow Gen. Ayres, and mass his 
"■ troo})s behind the iiitrenchments near Mrs. Butler's. 

'' III. Gen. Griffin will immediately withdraw Gen. Bart- 
" lett to his present position, then move back to the Plank- 
" road and down it to Dinwiddie C\ 11., and report to Gen. 
" Sheridan. 

" IV. Capt. llorrell, with his escort, will remain where 
" Gen. Griffin's headquarters now are till daybreak, and then 
" come back to the Plank Road, bringing in all stragglers. 

"Y. Division connnanders, in executing this movement, 
" which is ordered by Gen. Meade, will take care k) see that 
"none of their pickets or any portion of the troops are left be- 
" hind. 

"VI. Gen. Ayres and Gen. Grawf )rd will have their ti"oo])s 
"under arms at daybreak, and the chief of artillery will have 
"all the batteries in readiness to move." 

At 9.50 p. m. I received, by telegraph, the following from 
Gen. AVebb, written 9.20 p. m. : 



18 OPERATIONS TO 6UCCOK SHERIDAN. 

" The (livisiuu to be sent to Sheridan will start at once. 
'' You are to be held free to act within the Boydton Plank 
''Koad. (len. lluiii]»]ireys will hold to the road and the re- 
" turn." 

To tlii^ I iiiiniediatelv replied : 

'' Yoiii- dispatch of 1>.20 is just received. I had already 
••' sent out my orders, of which I send you a copy. You directed 
" Gen. Griffin to l)e sent to Gen. Sheridan at once. It will 
"■ take so much time to g;et his command together that I witli- 
"■ drew the other divisions tirst, they being unengaged ; but 
"this will not retard Gen. Griffin. The bridge is broken on 
" the Plank-road, and will take I hardly know how long to 
" make ])racticable for infantry. I sent an officer (Capt. Ben- 
" yaurd, Engin'r) to examine it as soon as your tirst order was 
" received. He now I'eports it not passable for intantry. It 
"•requires a span of forty feet to complete the bridge, and the 
"■stream is too deep to ford. IS^evertheless, I will use every- 
" tiling I can get to make it passable by the time Gen. Grif- 
" tin's division reaches it." 

Gen. Griffin's division, in addition to the delay of assem- 
l)ling Gen. Bartlett's brigade, had to withdraw a picket line 
ill front of tlie enemy, and, if it moved tirst, the others, pend- 
ing it, had to relieve this picket line. 

The bridge over Gravelly Run we had found broken by 
the enemy on our occupation of the Plank-road on the 29th. 
As I was required to operate inde]»en(lent of the cavalry, and 
[)rotect my own Hanks, it was desirable to me (being in my 
rear, as I faced the enemy on the White Oak Road), that it 
sliould remain so. Even the dispatch of this evening from 
(ieii. Meade, which I received at 8 p. m. (previously given), 
would have justitied me in destroying it had it yet been stand- 
ing intact. 1 liad no pontoons wath nt^ now ; the supply wath 
which I started on the 20th had been used in bridging Row- 
anty Creek and the Quaker Road crossing of Gravelly Run, 
and the boats and engineers were kept there for the service of 
tlic trains. 

At 9.15 |). m. I received, by telegraj)h, the following dis- 
patcii from Gen. Webb, written lO.-lO p.m.: 



OPEKATIONS TO SUCCOR SHEElDAN. 19 

"Since yonr dispateli of 8.20 p. in.,tlie General ('(tinmaiid- 
"ingiindstliat it is impossible for Bartlettto join (Tritlin in time 
"to move y\\\h any pi-omptitude down tlie l>oydtoii I'lank- 
"road. Tie tlieretore directs that you send another <;■()( )d l)ri- 
"gado to join (IritHn, in the place of Bartlett's, in tliis move- 
" ment. Sheridan was attacked l)y live hriusuh's fi'om ( loi^hoTs 
" cor})s — three fr(»m Pickett's; jxissibly by two from (T(H'(h)n's, 
" one of them being IJoke's ohl brigade." 

This dispatch showed that my j)revions one, giving the 
condition of the bridge at Gravelly Unn, had not yet been 
received. I deemed it would show, when it was, that (ien. 
Bartlett could join Gen. GrifHn before tlie bridge would be 
passable, and that GritHn could thus reach Sheridan as soon as 
any one, and re(piire no change in my ])revious oi-der; and, 
while waiting the result of the reception of the knowledge of 
the state of the crossing by Gen. Meade, I at 10.5(1 ]>. m. re- 
ceived the following dispatch from him, written 10.15 p.m. : 

" Send Griffin promptly as ordered, by the Boydton Plank 
"Road, and move the balance of your connnand by tlie roa<l 
" Bartlett is on, and sti-ike the enemy's rear, who is between 
"him and Dinwiddie G. II. (tcu. Sheridan reports his posi- 
" tion as north of Dinwiddle G. II., near Di-. Snn'tlTs, the ene- 
" my holding the cross-roads at that point. Sliould the enemy 
"turn on you, your line of retreat will ])e by d. M. I'rooks' 
"and K. Boiseaii's, on the Boydton Plank-road. (See one- 
" inch map.) Yon must be very pronq^t in this movement, 
"and o;et the forks of the road at J. M. Brooks' bef.re the 
"enemy, so as to open to II. Boiseau's. The enemy will ]>rob- 
" ably retire toward Five Forks, tliat being the direction of 
"their main attack this day. Don't encund)er yourself with 
"anything that will impede your progress or prevent youi" 
"moving in any direction. Let me know when Gi'illin starts 
" and when you start," 

This dispatch also showed that mine, concerning the cross- 
ing of Gravelly Run, was still not received. That I did not 
over-estimate the effect of this dispatch, when it should reach, 
is proved by Gen. Meade's dispatch written at 11.45 p.m. (See 
p. 24.) It also showed com])lete ignorance of the ])o6itio]i of 



20 OPERATIONS TO SUCCOE SHERIDAN. 

tlie enemy along " tlie road Bartlett is (was) on," for tlie enemy 
already held this road on tlie south side of Gravelly Knn, and, 
if not themselves at J. M. Brooks', occupied our approach to 
it. The condition of affairs here is given by Major Cope, in 
his report, as follows : 

" Al)out 5 p. m. you directed me to lead Bartlett's brigade 
" by a direct road, if possible, toward the sound of firing in 
" the direction of Dinwiddle C. H., and attack the enemy in 
" the rear. I immediately reported to Gen. Bartlett, who had 
" his column put in motion. Tlie left of the corps rested in 
" open ground. We came out from the left and crossed this 
"oTound for half a. mile; then we came to a small branch of 
" Gravelly Run on the edge <;»f the timber. Here we found a 
" wood-road that ran in the right direction. We followed it 
" one mile through the wood over rolling ground, crossing the 
" branches of Gravelly Run. At the south edge of this tim- 

"ber, and in open ground on a hill, stands Dr. 's house 

" (and here our skirmishers l>ecame engaged with the enemy's 
" pickets). The ground slopes from here to Gra^'elly Run, and 
"is open all the way down. The enemy, after considerable 
" skirmishing, were driven down the slope and across the Run 
"three-quarters of a mile from the house. The house is near 
" a main road leading north from Dinwiddle C. H. to the 
" main road. Gen. Bartlett established a line of pickets along 
" Gravelly Run crossing this road. He also kept videttes out 
" on his right watcliing this road and other approaches in the 
" rear. It was much after dark when he had made the proper 
" disposition of his troops, and then we l)egan to turn our at- 
" tention to the number and extent of the enemy's camp fires. 
" They seemed to stretch for miles on the south side of tlie 
" Run, and we could distinctly hear tlieni chop]>ing, moving 
"wagons and talking." 

In addition to this, tlie enemy held the point on the road 
Bartlett was on, where it joins the AVhite Oak Road, as had 
been ascertained by Major Gentry of my staff, while endeav- 
oring to commnnicate with Gen. Bartlett. The Major lost 
his orderly by capture, while he narrowly escaped himself. 
It was now one hour and a half since my order had been 



OPERATIOXS TO SUCCOK SHERIDAN. 21 

sent M'itlidnuviiig the divisions t<> tlie Plank-road, so tliat I 
supposed tliej were all nioN ino- back toward the Plank-road, 
along the forest road, Avith its single bridge across the liranch 
of Gravelly Run, and in the order of Ayres, Crawford, Grif- 
fin, with Gen. BartlettV brigade nearly rejoined to the latter. 
To prevent the confusion and delay that would occur by bring- 
ing Gen. Griffin to the Plank-road and sending back Gen. 
Ayres, one of which would have to leave the road for the other 
to pass, and to save the time that would be lost l)y each divi- 
sion in changing their relative places, I determined to send 
Gen. Ayres' division to Dinwiddle C. H. instead of Gen. Grif- 
fin's, as it greatly sim])lified and expedited the operation, and 
saved the men's strength so sorely tried. It had, beside, the 
effect to prevent the separation of brigades from their proper 
divisions, and keep each intact — a matter of importance. As 
quickly as I could write it, I at 11 p. m. issued the following 
order : 

" 1*'^. Gen. Ayres, instead of halting his command, as 
" directed in his last order (see mine on p. IT), will ])roceed 
" down the plank-road to Dinwiddie C. H., and re])ort to 
" Gen. Sheridan. He will send a staff officer to rejtoi't here 
" when the head of the column arrives. 

" 2r?. Gen. Ci'awfbrd and Gen. (iriffiu will mass their 
" divisions at the point where the order reaches them, and 
" report their position by the officer that brings it. A change 
" of plan makes this change of order necessary." 

I note here, a little out of the order of time, that I did not 
learn the position of (ien, Grawford and Gen. Griffin till 1 
a. m., and so difficult had it been to get the troo])s in motion 
on this intensely dark and stormy night, that, although this 
order from me was sent one hour and a half after the one for 
them to fall back to the Plaidc-road, yet it found them still in 
the same position. It must be remembered that (»ur troops, so 
near the enemy, could not be roused by drums and bugles or 
lond commands, but each order had to be conmiunicated from 
each commander to his subordinate, from the General till it 
reached the non-commissioned officers, which hitter oidy could 
arouse each man bv a shakino-. 



22 OPERATIONS TO SUCCOR SHERIDAN. 

Tlic Obstacles to overcome in carrying ont so many orders 
ill the darkness of a stormy, starless niglit, when the moon 
had set, deserves a statement of them in detail. 

The roads and paths the statf. otRcers and messengers 
would have to take, were often tilled with troops, and were as 
bad as clayey soil at the breaking np of winter conld make 
them. These rontes were mostly shut in by the evergreen forests 
through wliich they passed, rendering the night's darkness as 
profound as that of the deepest caverns. The horse, exhausted 
for want of food and wearied with life-and-death exertions, 
carrietl his rider slowly tln'ough the mud, and staggered and 
stumbled over the obstructions. The messenger disappeared 
on his mission the instant lie moved, and once out of call of 
the voice, could not be stopped or found till he had made the 
tour his instructions required, and returned to the place of 
departure. On arriving at his destination, the messenger, 
though, perhaps, lamiliar with it in the daylight just closed, 
Could scarce recognize it in the light of the camp-tires, which 
luirned around him on every side, showing everything in 
disproportioned and unreal forms. By these tires, the ex- 
hausted soldiers slept heavily, almost deaf to the cpiestions 
addressed to ascertain the locality, <»r answered half in their 
sleep. The commanding othcers, to escape the noise of 
drivers urging their struggling teams along the muddy 
roads, and the straggling of men over them as they slept, 
were compelled, in seeking repose, to establish their head- 
quarters a little away from the main routes ; and this alone 
many times caused vexatious delays in getting orders to them. 
Added to these were the vicissitudes of battle, which always 
left the commands and detachments scattered, more or less, as 
the day closed, and much increased the difficulties of getting 
the orders for a general movement in the night, sometimes 
causing such detachments to be left entirely without orders, 
when all the rest of their commands had moved away. 

Knowing all these things, every precaution was used to 
provide for them, but yet they always existed. 

In order to comply with Gen. Meade's first order, I had 
first to send an officer to each division. Then Major Cope was 



OPEKATIONS TO SUCCOR SlIEKIDAN. 23 

the only person capable (.f taking an order to (Jen. liartlett's 
Brigade, and he was sent. I had sent Major Gentry to ascer- 
tain Gen. Bartlett's location ; bnt he, taking the White Oak 
Road, fonnd the enemy holding the junction of it with the 
one Gen. Bartlett was on, and tailed, as before stated, to 
find a way to him. I had to send another othcer fo]- the 
pioneers, and go with tliem at once to the crossing of Gravelly 
Run, to make the l)ridge. 1 had to send another t(» the 
bridge itself, to re})ort the condition of the cl■ossin^•. I bad, 
with my full complement of staff officers, bnt the foUo\vin<>- 
available, all the others being engaged in their appro])riate 
departments: Col. Bankhead, Major Gentry, Major Cope, 
Capt. Benyaurd, Capt. Wadsworth, and Ca])t. Winslow. 

Having, under these circumstances, made my dispo'sitions 
to execute one order for a general nioyenient promptlv, it is 
easy to see ^yhat strait I was placed in to countermand 
those orders before the officers sent out with the first one 
returned. 

But to resume the narration. After I had sent the order 
last cpioted, I informed Gen. Meade what I had done, as 
follows : 

" I issued my orders, on Gen. Webb's first dispatch, to fall 
" back, which made the divisions retire in the order they 
"could most readily move, viz.: Ayres, Crawford, and 
" Griffin. I cannot change them to-night without ]»ro(bicing 
" confusion that will render all my operations nugatory. 1 
" will now send Gen. Ayres to Gen. Sheridan, and take (icn. 
" Griffin and Gen. Crawford to move against the enemy, as 
" this last dispatch directs I should. Otherwise, 1 cannot 
" accomplish the apparent olyects of the orders I have 
" received." 

I proceeded to make the necessary orders and arrange- 
ments to move with the two divisions as soon as I could. The 
movement had to be nuide without artillery, or ambulances, 
or ammunition wagons, and instructions had to be gi\cn, in 
the two latter cases, for s[)ccial ju-ovisions. The Cliicf of 
Artillery had to be informed, and relations established 
between him and Gen. Iluuiphrcys, eomnuinding the Sccoiul 



24 OPERATIONS TO SUCCOR SHERIDAN. 

Corps, whose troops were required to take iiiv place along 
the Plank-road. 

At twenty minutes past twelve, I received the following 
from Gen. Humphreys : 

" I am directed to resume my position of this morning, 
" &c., &c. At what time do you propose to move 'I I 
" propose to move simultaneously with you." 

To this I sent the following reply : 

" I have just received your dispatch, by Capt. AVistar. 
" Under the order to withdraw at once," (viz., that received 
at 9.17 p. m.), " I thought we each could do so individually 
" under cover of darkness, and so ordered. I have since 
" received orders to attack the enemy Avith two divisions, 
" sendhig one down the Plank-road to report to Gen. Sher- 
" idan. My artillery, live four-gun batteries, under Gen. 
" Wainwright, will remain on the line of the Plank-road. I 
" think the enemy that drove Gen, Sheridan must withdraw 
" to-niirht. I had a brio-ade on the road north from J. 
" Boiseau's. I have now orders , to move against the force 
" that attacked Sheridan, and shall send all I have to move 
" there, or \oherever the tiring of battle near us may in- 
" dicate." 

At 1 a. m., I received reports from my officers who had 
returned from carrying my order of 11 p. in., and learned 
the position of Gens. Crawford and Griffin. At this time, I 
received the folhjwing dispatch from Gen. Meade, written by 
him at llh. 15ni. p. m. : 

" A dispateJi, partially tranHniltted, is received, indicating 
" the bridge over Gravelly Run is destroyed, and time will he 
" 7'equired to rebuild it. If this is the case, would not time 
" be gained by sending the trocyps by the Quaker Road? 
" Time is of the ittmost importance. Sheridan cannot main- 
" tain hiinself at Dinwiddie loithout reinforcements, and yours 
" are the only ones that can be sent. Use every exertion to get 
'" troops to him as soon as possible. If necessary, send trooj)s 
"■ by both roads, and give up the rear attacl'. If Sheridan is 



OPEKATIONS TO SUCCOR SHEEIDAX. 25 

" not reinforced^ and comixlld to faU Ixirk^ he will retire !>>/ 
" the Vaughcm Iioif(/." 

On reeeiviiio- this dispatcli, showinn' so imicli solicitiidr lor 
Gen. SlicridunV position, and the necessity <»f reinl'oreinu' liini 
directly, even if I had t(» eonntennand the ])revions order, and 
forego entirely the rear attack, and wliich, also, left the (pies- 
tion for nie to determine, I felt nnich anxiety about what to 
do. The night was lar advanced. The distance to Din- 
Aviddie C II. by tlu; (^lakei- Koad, from the location oi' mv 
troops, .was over ten miles. Il was im}»o>sil»le lor tlicm to 
reach there by that i-oad bcfoiv s a. m. Hy that time 
they could be of no use in holding I )iii\\iddie C. II. In this 
case, the Uiost direct route for the rear attack would be down 
the J-*lank-road, where Gen. Ayres was marching. Tliis 
attack, too, Avould bo then the most etfective, as the whole 
corps would be tt)gether in making it. and all in c(»nnnunica- 
tion with head-quarters and Gen. Sheridan, which might be of 
great importance. If Gen. Sheridan retired by the Vaughan 
Road, too, the rear and right flank of Gen. Humphreys Avould 
be left exposed, as stated in Gen. Meade's dispatcli, received 
by me at 8 p. m. (already given here). To send the divi- 
sion around l>v the (>>uaker Koad was to lireak my command 
up in three pieces, and, if it had been done, it is doubtful if 
the success of the 1st of April would have been gained, as the 
men thus sent would have l»een too exhausted to reach the 
Five Forks that day. 

I therefore determined that it was best t<f) al)ide the move- 
ments already begun, and keep the two divisions, Griffin's 
and Crawford's, where they were, till I could hear that Gen. 
Ayres certainly had reinforced (ien. Slieridau. The men of 
the two divisions were gaining, while waiting this result, a 
little of tliat rest they stood so much in need of, on this their 
fourth night of almost continual deprivation of it, and we had 
but a short distance to move before reaching the enemy, near 
J. Boiseau's, 

Having determined this, at one p. m., I wrote the follow- 
ing dispatch to Gen. Meade : 

" I think we will have an iiifantry Ijridge over Gravelly 
4 



26 " OPERATIONS TO SUCCOR SHERIDAN. 

" Run sooner than I conld send troops around by the Quaker 
" Road. But* if I iind any faihire, I will send that way. I 
" have sent Capt. Benyaurd (two liours ago) with what he 
" thought was necessary to make it practicable in one hour, 
" and trust to that. I am sending to Gen. Sheridan my most 
'• available force." 

At 2.5 a. m., I learned the following, which I sent 
Gen. Webb: 

'" The bridge over Gravelly Run Capt. Benyaurd reports 
" now practicable for infantry, and Gen. Ayres advancing 
" across it toward Dinwiddle C. II. I have given Gen. Ayres 
" orders to report to Gen. Sheridan." 

At I| a. m. I received information that Gen. Ayres had 
communicated with Gen. Sheridan, and, while I was just 
mounting to "'oin Generals Griffin and Crawford, to move 
across the country against the enemy at J. Boiseau's, I received 
the following from Gen. Sheridan, at 4..50 a. m., which is 
published with his report, and there stated to be written at 3 
a. m. 

" I am holding in front of Dinwiddle C. II., on the road 

"leading to Five Forks, for three-quarters of a mile, with Gen. 

'' Custer's division. The enemy are in his immediate front, 

" lying so as to cover the road just this side of the Adams' 

" House, whieli le ids out across Chamberlain's heel or 7hui. I 

" understand you have a division at J. Boiseau's ; if so, you 

"ars in i^ear of the enemy''s line and almost on his Hank. I 

" will hold on here. Possibly they may attack Custer at day- 

" light ; if so, have this division attack instantly and in full 

"force. Attack at daylight any way, and I will make an 

" effort to get the road this side of Adams' House, and if I do, 

" you can capture the whole of them. Any force moving 

" down the road I am holding, or on the AVhite Oak Road, 

" will be in the enemy's rear, and in all probability get any 

" force that may escape you by a liank attack. Do not fear 

'' mv leaving here. If the enemy remain I shall tight at day- 

" Hght." 

This suppositious state of affairs given above promised most 



OPERATIONS TO SUCCOR SHERIDAN. 27 

brilliant ro.Milts if ti'iip, l)uf it \va^ not. The oiicniv occupied 
the pr»sitii»n at J. B.»iseau's oii the preceiliii<4' nii;'ht, and in- 
stead of my havino; a division there, the nearest to it 1 had 
was Bai'tlett's brigade, about three-(juartei's of a mile north of 
Gravelly Jiun, the crossing; of which the enemy guarded. 
Even this brigade of mine I had to withdraw, by Gen, Meade's 
order, at D.-SH p. m. I fully expected, if the enemy had not 
retreated, to have to light a battle in order to get across Grav- 
elly Rnn near to J. Boiseaii's, and, if the enemy had designed 
to stay, we undoubtedly must bave done so. I so anticipated 
in my instruetions to Gen. Gritiin. About 5 a. m. Gen. Grittin 
left liis position near the enemy on the White Oak Road, and 
moved directly and rapidly across tbe country to Crumps. 
He found the enemy had left tbe crossing of the Hun open, 
and lie moved on to J. Boiseau's, meeting at the forks of the 
road our cavalry, under Gen. Devin. At this point Gen. 
Gritbn reported to Gen. Sheridan, as I bad directed, should 
such a state of affairs as was found be developed. 

I remained witb Gen. Crawford's division, which we formed 
to retire in line of battle to meet the enemy, should be pursue 
us from his breastworks, as I couHdently expected he would 
as soon as he discovered our mo\'enients.'-^ I also deployed my 
escort to retire toward the Plank-road to take l)ack any men 
or supplies which might l)e coming to that point through igno- 
rance of tbe changes tliat had been made in the night, (len. 
Griffin's march having been unobstructed, I did not reach him 
till be bad met our cavalry. I tben ascertained, too, that 
Gen. Ayres' division Avas massed about half a mile south of us 
near J. M. Brooks's. 

It M-ill lie recollected that Gen. Ayres began to move back 
from the AVbite Oak Road by an order from me, sent at 9.35 
p. m., and wbicb was tbe first intimation of sending troops 

* The neglect of the enemy to follow up Gen. Crawford's division as he with- 
drew is still iiiex})licable to me, for had they done so, Gen. Lee woidd have been 
early informed of the movement of our infantry against his detached force at 
Five Forks, and either liave reinforced them or warned them to withdraw, and 
the disaster to them which resulted might have not occurred. It seems to mc 
an oversight not to have been expected from our previous experience. 



28 OPEKA.TIONS TO SUCCOE SHERIDAN. 

to Gen, Slieridan. Xo orders stopped him, nor did anything 
dehxY hiin hut physical ol)star*les — sneli as the darkness, bad 
roads, and broken bridge. I will now qnote from his report 
the resnlt : 

''The division was ordered to mov^e down the Boydton 
" Pike during the night of March 31, and report to Gen. Sher- 
'' idan at Dinwiddle C. H. Before arriTing there it was met 
" by a staff officer of Gen. Sheridan, with instructions to turn 
" oif on a road leading west into a road leading from Dinwid- 
" die C. II. to the White Oak Eoad" {i. e., from E. Boiseau's 
to J. M. Brooks'), " and come upon the left and rear of the 
" enemy, who was facing Gen. Sheridan's command near Din- 
" widdie. As we approached, just after clayJigJd, the enemy 
" hastily decamped." 

This actual trial disposes of the question of the ability of 
my troops to reach Gen. Sheridan by midnight. It took Gen. 
Ayres till daybreak. 

It may be said, in suj^iport of the expectations, that the 
state of the bridge and stream were not known when the ex- 
pectations were formed ; but they should have been. The 
route was used for communications between Gen. Grant and 
Gen. Sheridan the two preceding days. But even if not known 
then, they certainly were when Gen. Slieridan wrote his re- 
port and Gen. Grant authorized its publication, and it was 
but manly and just to have then corrected any unfavorable 
impression his lack of knowledge at the time may have 
caused him to take up concerning me. 

But, let us suppose the two divisions that Gen. Grant di- 
rected to be moved by J. Boiseau's, w^ere expected to reach 
Gen. Sheridan by midnight. The order which I re(,'eived was 
written by Gen. Meade 10.15 p. m., live minutes after Gen. 
G/ant's to Gen. Sheridan. It reached me 10.50 p. m., thirty- 
live minutes nfter being written. Supposing all possible dis- 
patch used, twenty minutes at least would be rec[uired for me 
to make the necessary arrangements; twenty more minutes 
would be required to carry my order to the divisions; twetity 
more minutes for them to transmit them to the brigades ; and 
forty minutes, at least, for the troops to get ready to move ; 



OPERATIONS TO SUCCOR SHERIDAN. 29 

for it must l)e reiuonilx-i-ed tliut no l)no-lt>s or dniuis could Itc 
used to sound calls or aronso the men. No general could 
make })lans based on ivreator rapidity of execution tlian here 
allowed, and our experience rarely realized it on the most favor- 
able occasions, while this was one of the least so. Sunimin<i' 
up these intervals of time M'e have two hours to add to the 
time of Gen. Grant writino- to Gen. Shei-idan. I venture to 
say it took nearly this time for the note itself to reach Gen. 
Sheridan. Adding these two hours, would make it at least 
twelve o'clock l)ef<:)re my two divisions could move. They then 
had four miles to travei'se, taking the White Oak Itoad, before 
reaching the crossing of Gravelly Run, which would occupy 
till 2 a. m. They had then to cross the stream and strike the 
rear of the enemy opposed to Gen. Sheridan, enumerated by 
him as follows : 

" The opposing force was Pickett's division, Wise's inde- 
" pendent brigade of infantry, and Fitz Hugh Lee's, Rossers', 
" and W. H. Lee's cavalry commands. This force is too strong 
" for us." 

To join Gen. Sheridan by midnight, on this route, I tiien 
had to capture or destroy whatever of this force was between 
me and Gen, Sheridan. Any expectations more unreasonable 
could not have been formed, nor wonld I attribute them to any 
one not wholly ignorant of the true state of the case. 

In regard to intercepting the enemy, the facts, show it was 
impossible under the circumstances. I learned from deserters 
that they had begun to move toward Five Forks as early as 
10 p. m. the night before, believing their ])osition would l)e 
untenable the next morning. They had conse(|uently with- 
drawn in the night, carrying otf their wounded and leaving 
only a cavalry picket in (xen. Sheridan's front, which, as Gen. 
Ayres says, "hastily decamped" as he approached at daylight. 
It will be seen by a dispatch of Gen. Meade to Gen. (irant, 
dated »'» a. m. (given hereafter), that Gen. Sheridan must have 
been aware of this withdrawal of the enemy early in the night. 

While awaiting with Gen. (iritfin for instructions tVom 
Gen. Sheridan, who had advanced with the cavalry toward 
Five Forks, I received, about 0| a. m., the following order, 
written bv Gen. Webb at 6 a. m. : 



30 OPEKATIONS TO SrCCOR SHEEIDAIf. 

" Gen. Meade directs that, in the movements following your 
"innctidii witli Gen. Sheridan, you will be under his orders, 
" and will re])ort to him. Please send a report of progress." 

T sent the report of progress requested, which was in ac- 
cordance wit] I the tacts hereinbefore given. 

To show how Gen. Meade was led to send me this order, I 
will give a copy of a dispatch from him to Gen. Grant, writ- 
ten a. m., April 1, an official copy (jf which was furnished 
me : 

" The officer sent to Sheridan returned between 2 and 3 
" a. m., without any written communication, but giving Gen. 
" S.'s opinion that the enemy were retiring from his front. 
"• The absence of tiring this morning would seem to contirm 
" this. I was asleep at the time this officer returned, and did 
"not get the information till just now. Should this prove 
" true, Warren will be at or near Dinwiddle soon, with his 
'' whole corps, and will require further orders.'' 

This dispatch shows an important circumstance also that 
affects the question of my ability to intercept the enemy. The 
officer that brr»ught Gen. Meade this information from Gen. 
Sheridan, between 2 and 3 a. m., could not have left Gen. 
Sheridan less than two hours previous, the distance being about 
ten miles over the worst possible roads ; so that Gen. Sheridan 
thought the enemy was retiring as early, at least, as between 
12 and 1, and the information could scarce have reached Gen. 
Sheridan, Irom his picket line, in less than one hour's time, so 
that the enemy's movements in retiring must have become ap- 
parent as early, at least, as between 11 and 12. This confirms 
the reports deserters, in the morning, gave me, and which the 
completeness of the withdrawal sustains. Thus, at the very 
time of the night that Gen. Sheridan tliought the enemy re- 
treating, I was impressed, by repeated dispatches from Gen. 
Meade, that Gen. S. could not hold on without reinforcements, 
and I acted under that authority and belief. 

The order from Gen. Meade placing me under Gen. Sher- 
idan's orders, however, was not necessary for that purpose, as 
I should have obeyed any orders Gen. Sheridan might give me, 
recognizing him as my superior army commander. 



BATTLE OF FIVE FOEKS. 31 



BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS. 



When I met Gen. S., at about 11 a. n\., his manner was 
cordial and friendly. I liad never served with him before. 

After talking with Gen. Slieridau a short time, at the jihice 
I found him, while he was oceasionallv receiving reports from 
his cavalry, he mounted and rode otf to the front. \t 1 p. m. 
an oificer brought to me an order to bring up the infantry. I 
at once dispatched Col. (now Brevet Brig.-Gen.) Bankhead to 
give the orders to the division ct)mmanders to bring up their 
commands, specifying the order Avhich I thought they could 
most rapidly move in. 1 then went up the Five Forks Road 
in advance of the infantry, to see Gen. Sheridan and t(» inform 
myself of the use to he made of my troops, so that no time 
would be lost on their arrival. Gen. S. explained to me tlic 
state of atfairs, and wdiat his plan was for me to do. This 1 
entered npon most cordially. Gen. S. had placed an ofticer 
back on the road to mark the point wdiere my command \\'as 
to turn off. I then rode back to the point indicated, tui-ned 
up the road which led by Gravelly Run Church, and e.tamined 
the ground, and em2)loyed my escort, which had by this time 
rejoined me, to picket tlie front I was to take up, so as to ])re- 
vent the enemy discovering the presence of the infantry. 

Gen. Sheridan's order was to form the whole corps liefore 
advancing, so that all of it should move simultaneously, lie 
specially stated that the formation was to be ol)lique to the 
road, with the right advanced, with two divisions in front and 
the third in reserve behind tlie right division. The nuud)ej- of 
lines and consecpient extent of front he left me t(» decide. 
Upon exann'nation, 1 determined on an e(juivalent of tliree 
lines of battle for each of the frijnt divisions, ari-anged as 
follows : Each division was to ])lacc two brigades in front, each 
brigade in two lines of battk', and the tliird brigade in two 
lines of battle behind the centre of the two front lines. The 
third division to be posted in column of battalions in nuiss 
behind the right. To (icn. Ayrcs 1 assigned my left. Gen. 
Crawfird my right, and Gen. (iritHii my reserve l>ehind the 
right. In moving, they were instructed to keep closed to the 



.^9, 



BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS. 



left, and to preserve their direetiuii in the woods, by keeping 
the sun, then sliining brightly, in the same position over their 
left shoulders.. 

(Ten. Ayres placed the Maryland Brigade on his left, in 
two lines, and Gen. Gwin's Brigade on his right ; this last 
brigade was formed in three lines instead of two, as the regi- 
ments could not be so well disposed in two lines. Gen. Wiii- 
throp's Brigade, Gen. Ayres formed as his reserve. Gen. 
Crawford formed his line so as to place Col. Kellogg's Brigade 
on his left, Gen. Baxter's Brigade on his right, and Gen. 
Coulter's Brigade as his reserve. 

The length of the front we occupied was about a thou- 
sand yards. The casualties of the three preceding days, 
together with those who had given out from Aveariness, or 
were absent on detached duty, had proliably reduced our 
effective force at least a thousand men in each division below 
that with which we set out on the 28th, so that we had then 
present al)out twelve thousand men. 

While tlie troops were forming, I prepared tlie accompany- 
ing sketch, witli explanations, for each division commander, 
and directed them, as far as time would admit, to explain it 
to the brigade commanders : 

" April 1, o p. m. 

" The following is the movement noAV about to be exe- 
" cuted : 




white: oak road 



4 



" Tlie line will move forward as f(»rmed till it reaches the 
" White Oak Road, when it will swing round to the left, per- 



BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS, 33 

" peiuliciilav to the Wliite Oak Road. Gen. "Men-ittV and 
'' Gen. CnsterV Gavaliy M'ill cliaro-e tlie enemy's line as soon 
" as the infantry get engao-ed. The eavalrv is on the h'tt of 
"• tlie infantry, exeept IVFeKenzie's, M'hich is nioving uj. tlie 
" Wliite Oak Ivoad from the riglit." 

. Gen. (xritiin, in his report, says tlie foi-mation ] trior to the 
attaek \yas as follo^ys: 

"Tlie First Division on the rio-ht tlank formed in three 
" lines, with one brigade on the right en echelon." 

I snpjdied Gen. (irithn ^yith the same sketch and ]»lan of 
operations as I had Gen. Ayres and (ien. Crawford, in which 
I thonght I indicated Gen. Griffin's ])osition in rear of the 
right. Bnt the necessity for him to jn-otect his own tlank, 
and the wedge-like shape of the formation, as a whole, led 
Gen. Griffin to regard his division as on the right. 

Gen. Sheridan says, in his report, that he dii'ected '' one 
" diyision to be formed in reserye opposite the centre."^ This 
is a mistake, his order was to form it in rear of the right. The 
line was to be formed " obliquely to and at a point a short dis- 
" tance from the White Oak Road," this tlnvw the right in 
tlie advance, and it was supposed by him, would sti'ike the 
eneni}^ first and need the support. 

During the formation of my troops, I used all the exertions 
possible to hasten their arrival, and everything was so prepared 
for them, that they marched at once to their assigned position 
wntbout a halt. 

Gen. Sheridan expressed to me the apprehension that the 
cavalry, which continued to fire on the enemy, would use up 
all their amniuniti(»n before my troo])s would be ready. I in- 
formed him that they would not all I»e in ])osition before 4 
p. m., but that I was ready ti» moye at once witli whatever 
was at hand, if he dii-or-tcd, and let the rest follow: but lie 
did not. iris iin])atience was no greater, apparently, than I 
felt myself, and which I strove to repress and ])reyent any 
exhibition of, as it would but tend to iin]»air coididence in the 
proposed operaticms. When everything possible is being done, 
it is important to have the men think it is all that success 
requires, if their confidence is to be retained. 



'i-i: BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS. 

Ao-aiiist Gen. Sheridan's most ung-enerons statement, that 
I gave him the impression that I wanted the sun to go down, 
I simply place my denial, and trust that my whole conduct in 
life, and especially in this war, sustains me in it. The sun did 
not set until two hours and a lialf after tlie formation was 
completed. 

In proof of the efforts I made to get the troops in position, 
and the rapidity Avith which they did move, I present the fol- 
lowing communications from Brevet Brig.-Gen. Bankhead, of 
my staff; Brevet Maj.-Gen. Crawford, commanding Third 
Division ; Brevet Maj.-Gen. Griffin, commanding First Di^d- 
sion ; Brevet Maj.-Gen. Ayres, Second Division. 

Gen. Bankhead writes me, under date of June 27: 

" Sir : In reply to your letter of the iTth inst., received 
" the 25th, I Inive tlie honor to state that I was with you 
" April 1st, at the time you received some instructions from 
" Gen. Sheridan, tln-ongh one of his staff officers. As to the 
" nature of the orders I am not aware, further than that you 
" immediately turned to me, and directed me ' to bring up 
" ' the corps at once along the road we were at the time, and 
" ' that you W(ndd meet the column yourself ; that the divi- 
" ' sions would march in the following order, viz.. Third, 
" ' First, Second.' I immediately galloped l)ack, and gave the 
" orders, in person, to Generals Griffin and Crawford. As I was 
" directed to see the head t)f the column was started on the 
" right road, I sent tlie order to Gen. Ayres, commanding 
" Second Division (who was further off to the right), Ijy one 
" of your Aids, either Major Cope or Capt. Wadsworth. 

" The orders were obeyed promptly, and the troops moved 
" out as ex])editiously as the nature of tlie road and the crowded 
" state it was in (being blocked up with lead cavalry horses) 
" would admit. Every exertion appeared to be made by Gen. 
" Crawi'ord, who had the a(Tvance, to keep the road clear for 
" the infantry to pass. I remained with the head of the column 
" until within a short distance of the place it was halted and 
" placed in position to make the attack. 

" (Signed) II. C. BANKHEAD, 

" Brevet Col., AssH Insjp. Gen''' 



BATTLE OF FlVJi FOKKS. 3o 

The lulluwing is fruiii Gcii. Crawlbrd, (lalod July IT: 
" General: In reply to your connuunicatiou oi' ,Iuiie 17, 
" askiug if my division did uot move, with all ])ra('ticalile dis- 
" patch, in formiuu^ prior to our attack on tlie enemy at the 
" battle of Five Forks, T have the houor to state, that the 
" troops under my comuumd moved at once, uj)on the receipt 
" of the order, and that, in my o})inion, no unnecessary time 
" was lost from that time till they were formed as you 
" directed. 

'^ (Si-ned) S. W. CEAWFORD, 

"• Brevet Mc(j.-GenP 

The following is from Gen. Grithn, dated June 20 : 
" General: In reply to your commuiucation of the 17th 
" instant, in reference to the movement (»f the First Division 
" just prior to the battle of Five Forks, April 1, ISf!."), 1 have 
" to state I was in connuand (»f that division on that day,' and 
" about 2 o'clock j». m., received, through Col. Bankhead, 
" Corps Inspector, an order to nio\e down the road leading 
"• northward with all possible dispatch, as the cavalry and in- 
" fantry were to attack the enemy at once. I moved my 
" troops as promptly as I could, and on arriving near the 
" place wdiere the corps was formed for the attack, was met 
" by yourself. You innnediately })ointed out the ground that 
" my troops were to form on, remarking, in substance, that 
" you wished me to be as ex])editious as possible. The order 
" was executed at once, and I then reported in person to you. 
" In my o[)inion, the division was formed without any halting 
" or unnecessary delav. 

'^'(Signed) CHARLES (GRIFFIN, 

'' Brevet Maj.-Gen'' 

The following is from Gen. Ayres, datcil June 24: 
"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of yours of 
" the ITth inst., hist evening, asking an official stateihent con- 
" cerning the movement of the Filth Corps on the 1st of April, 
" from the ])osition where it was massed to that where the lines 
" of battle were forme<l previous to that attack. I do not 



36 BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS. 

" know at what time tlie order was given to connnenee the 
" movement. I was ordered to follow the First Division. This 
" was done, and my division was kept well closed np on the 
" troops in front. On arriving near the position where the 
"■ lines were forming, yon reqnested me to form my troops as 
" expeditiously as possible, as Gen. Sheridan desired to attack 
" the enemy immediately. Once again, during the fornuition, 
" you desired me to be expeditions. My division, being a very 
" small one, was soon formed, whereupon I reported to you 
" that I was ready. Tlie order w^as then given, and the troops 
" moved at once to the attack. 

" (Signed) E. B. AYRES, 

'' Brevet MaJ.-Ge?i:' 

In view of this testimony, it is apparent that Gen. Sheridan 
had left out of his calculations the necessary time to make the 
form-ation he directed, and that, in his own opinion, his plan 
was endangered thereby. 

The propriety of an army all moving at once pre-supposes, 
in order that the General who so employs it should be entitled 
to the credit of the results obtained, that he should have his 
information so exact that the mass tails directly upon a vul- 
nerable and vital point of the enemy's position. If there 
should be a mistake in this, the chief merit belongs to those 
exertions and arrangements by which the mistake is corrected, 
or in the new dispositions wdiich the occasion demands as re- 
quisite and which may be practicable. But Gen. Sheridan's 
calculation, as to the position of the left flank of the enemy's 
line was faulty, and to a very serious extent, considering that he 
had placed all the troops in position for the move. The changes 
we had to make afterward required the greatest exertion of my- 
self and staft', when everything was in motion, and in woods of 
the difficult nature usually found in Virginia, no one of the 
command being at all acquainted with the ground over which 
Ave were moving. 

After the forward movement begun, a few minutes brought 

us to the Wl>ite Oak Road, distant about a thousand yards. 

There we found the advance of Gen. McKenzie's Cavalry, 



]5A'lTLi: OF FIVE FORKS. 37 

M-liich, euiuiug up the White Oak Road, luul arrived there 
just before us. This sliowed ur;, for the lirst time, that Ave 
were too tar Ui our rio-ht of tlie enemy's left Hank. Gen. 
Ayres' right crossed the road in the open Held, and his division 
commenced changing front at once, so as to bring his line on 
the right tiank of the enemy's ]>osition. Fortunate! v for us, 
the enemy's left Hank so rested in the woods that he could not 
tire at us as we crossed this o])en tield, and the i)art of it that 
faced us formed a very shoi't line. This (len. Avrcs attacked 
at (»nce, the tiring being heavy, Init less than usuallv destruc- 
tive, on account of the thick woods. The rapid change of 
front by Gen. Ayres caused his right tlaidv, at tirst, to get in 
advance of Gen. Crawfoi-d's, owing to the greater distance 
the latter had to move, and e.\])osed it to being taken in tiank 
by the enemy. Orders were sent by me to Gen. Grawford 
to ol)li(]ue his division to the left and close up this interval. 

As soon as I had found the enemy's left tlank, orders were 
sent to Gen. Griffin, by several statf officers, to move also ob- 
li(piely to the left, and come in to the support of Gen. Ayres. 
But as Griffin's Division was nu)ving out of sight in the Avoods, 
the order only reached him in the ueighborhood of the ])lace 
marked '' Ghinnieys " on the nmp. While giving orders thus, 
I did not think it })roper to leave my place in the o])en tield, 
because it was one where my stalf officers, sent to ditferent 
parts of the comman<l, could innnediately tind me on their 
return, and thus 1 could get information from all jxiiiits at 
once, and utilize the nuiny eyes of my statf and those of mv 
conunanders, instead of going to some sjtecial ])oint myself', 
and neglect all others. 

The time had not arrived, in my judgment, for nu' to do 
that. It may be that at this tinu^ it was tliat (ien. Sheridan 
thought I did not exert myself to inspire confidence in the 
troo[)s that broke under a not very severe lire. There was no 
necessity f >r my personal ])i'eseiu'e for sucli jmrjiose i'c|MPi-tcd 
from any part •>!' the tield. 

The time which elai)sed Itcfore hearing from (icii. Craw- 
ford or Gen. (iritliu convinced ine they must ha\e jiasscd on 
bevond the riu'ht of Gen. Avres. Leaving sutlicicnt means 



38 BATTLE OF FIVE FOKKS. 

to send anv important information after iiie, I then rode 
ra])idlv to the rii;-ht, near the Chimneys, and was received 
with a consideral)le lire from the enemy across the open 
held. As I afterward learned, this lire occasioned some 
un^^tcadiness in Gen. Ay res' right, and also cansed the left 
of Gen. Crawford to ol)li(|ne to tlie riglit, so as to keep 
the protection of the ridge and trees. I remained here till 
Gen. Grihin arrived with his division, Avhen I directed him to 
attack tlie enemy on the right of Gen. Ayres, and this he pro- 
ceeded to do. I then rode back to Gen. Ayres' position, and 
found that he had captnred the enemy's extreme right and 
some thousand prisoners. This inf(>rmation I sent to Gen. 
Griffin, and then rode as rapidly as possible to direct Gen. 
C'rawford, as circumstances might recpiire. 

Before proceeding further, I will give quotations from 
Major Cope's report relating to the preceding. 

'' You sent me to Gen. Griffin with an order to bring his 
" division toward the White Oak Road, by the Hank, in order 
" to be in better supporting distance of the second division. 
" Also to inform Gen. Ci-awford that he was going S(.»niewhat 
" too far to the right. I found Gens. Griffin and CraAvford to 
" the right of the Chimneys, and ga\e them your orders. At 
" this time the enemy liad a line of skirmishers running from 
" the left of their line of works, by the Sidney House, toward 
" Hatcher's Eun. You came to ^vhere Gen. Griffin was, and 
" then returned to the White Oak Road, where I joined you a 
'' few minutes after. The part of the enemy's line where you 
" were had been carried by Gen. Ayres, and you sent me 
" again to Gen. Griffin, with this information, and Avitli an 
" order to push forward as fast as possible. He had already 
" reached the Sidney House, and was pushing forward across 
" the held. I delivered your order, and gave him the direc- 
" tion to advance, which was west," 

I also annex an extract from Gen. Ayres' report, describing 
his operations after the forward mosement began : 

" After moving through a wot)d into an opening, tlie 
" skirmishers engaged those of the enemy, pushing them 



BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS. 39 

" back. Soon after crossing tlie White Oak Road, finding 
" the enemy's lire to come from the left, T changed front to 
" the ]ei't, hyfaciiig the second brigade to tlie k'ft, and liliiig 
" it to the left. Xot to lose time, I also tlirew the lirst 
" brigade " (his reserve) ^'into the front line on tlie left of 
" the second. The tliird brigade, soon after eno'au'iiig the 
" enemy, iinding its right Hani< in the air (I must confess 
" that I experienced anxiety also on this acconnt) i)ortions 
" of it were very nnsteady, but snbse(in('ntly moved uj) and 
" bttre their part of the action in a handsome manner. After' 
" this change of fnmt, tlie troops were pushed Ibrward and 
" soon came n])on the left tiank of the enemy, which M'as 
" thrown back at right angles with his main line, and covered 
'' by a strong breastwoi'k, screened behind a dense undergi-owth 
" of pines, and abont one hundred yards in length. This 
" breastwork my troops charged, and took it at the bavonet's 
" point, capturing, in carrying it, over one thousand prisoners 
" and several battle-Hags. JlaUing there a short time hj Gen. 
" Sherirlivns order., till it vxis ajp])arent the enemy were giving 
" mmy generally., I pnshed forward rapidly, holding my men 
" in hand, and marching steadily in line of battle.'' 

I have italicised the " halting there," I've, l»ecanse it shows 
that Gen. Shei'idan modified his own order not to halt. Xo 
order to halt was given by me. AVliat caused the general 
giving way of the enemy while Gen. Ayres was halted by 
Gen. Sheridan's order, was due to the o])erations elscwhei'e 
directed. 

It will be seen that the I'apid change of front by Gen. 
Ayres, necessitated by the une.\i)ected condition of things, un- 
avoidably threw his Hank teiii])orarily in the "air." Had llie 
line gradnally swung round, by wheeling, (4(mi. Crawford 
wonld have been on his right, but as it Mas, the change had 
the momentary effect to leave (ien. Ci-awtbrd "en echelon," 
in rear of Ayres' right. It lia)»i)ened, also, that the right of 
Gen. Ayres became exposed, too, to a fire from the enemy 
across the open field, aronnd Sidney's, (tcu. Crawford's left 
encomitered this same fire, as it came np on Gen. Ayres' right, 
and the efiect was to cause Crawford's line to oblitpie some- 



i>) BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS. 

xrliat to tlie riglit to gain the cover of the wootls and riiiges, 
bnt it kept steadily moving on in the enemy's ivar — a threat- 
ening movement which made the position of the enemy no 
longer tenable, assaile<l as he was b<rtth in front and llank 
beside. 

I will now extract from Gen. Crawfonl's i-eport. After 
giving a copy of the order to attack that I had furnished him 
with <see p. 32X he says : 

" In obedience to this order we crossed Gravelly Run : 
" crossed the Wliite Oak Road, and changed dii-ei'tion to the 
** left, and advancetl dii-ectly west. AVe enconntei*eil the ene- 
*' mv's skimiishei's shortly after moving, driving them steadily 
*' back. Onr way led through lK)gs, tangled wootls, and 
'* thickets of pine. interspei*sed with open spaces here and 
'' there. The connection between the Second Division and 
'' my line, could not l>e maintained. I received an i»rder from 
" both Gen, Sheridan and Gen. AVan-en. to press rapidly for- 
" ward. I ni-ged on the entire command. Gen. Coulter's 
" Brigade, from l>eing in support of my rear, was brought to 
*' till the gap l>etween me and the Second Divisi»^»n. I pressed 
" immediately on and lound myself in the enemy's rear on 
" the Ford Road, which I crossed." * * •• Jnst at this 
'* point the enemy oi>ened on my center and left llank* a very 
** hea\"y fii'e. Maj.-Gen. TVarreu arriving on the lield at that 
" moment, directed me to advance immediately down the 
" Ford Road, and Gen. Coulter's Brigade was seleited for 
•• that pm-pose. Two regiments, commanded by Major Funk. 
" placed on what was then the left of the road, and the i;est 
" of the brigade were on the right, supported by the other two 
" brigades en echelon, I advanced at once, and captured a 
* battery of four gims and the battle-flag of the 32d Virginia 
*• Intantrv. "VTe then changed direction and advanced again 
" in a southwest direction, the enemy flying before us. though 
" keeping up a desultory firing." 

Gen. Griflin's report says : 

'• Immediately after, the order to advance against the enemy 
" was criven. with instructions to the division that after it had 



BATTLE 0* nVE fOJKilS- 41 

" ' '•■>— *d the fjraid it ir»;- ^ -t .- -_- dfreetio'n - -i- ' -■. 

•rike the **rhf^m^ r'^r. 

" S'-f-^-'Ut a : rjt, save a few cavaJrv 

"''""**" ^ ,, ._.^ ^ Off mosietrr to tbe 
rear, tLie div. 

'liiift baiting:, ander the eireflmstaaces, was a eonxmeadable 
e>-- ' " ■ - . 

feh. , _ _:- _,_ ..., ... ,...- .„. _ 

tioiL To eiffeet tkis eame tiiiiig I bad sent Major Cox»e to him, 
ar ,'■ ' ■ '-d. A. ■ • ' 

\jk' .. 'ed iri t^ , .. . ;... _ :, .^ ..:...,...., 

OD with Gen. Crav isioo, aud was used br me on the 

F'b'rd Kost,d. Gen. < rr 

■^ moved against the ene...^ ".,...^^...- •. ..^,.,-;.- 

workfe and ly5(KJ pri&oners. 

Aft stated bj Oren. Cra.w.iur<i, I hi* di^T^ion 

near B. Boiseau's after h'- '' - ' - --^ a..,..,*d. He had 

been driving back the all the way. and 

eontinoally triming the leit -•! any i-^rce opposing Geois. Arreis 
j^r.ri <.,-:~r,_ J j^^ once directe*! hi> I'' * — :- _- - ..^ i ♦ — - 
6* .as we had now cloi^ up 

escape northward, and to move ^>wn upon tne position ot the 
enemy at the fork« of the r ' - ■- * - ^ - ■- - — - ^ - 
the firing of some piece*? 

GeiL Crawford's troops r<».j'n eneonnterea a strtt line of the 
enemy funned t-,- t-.--* ^ ' _ ,i .-_ . .? ^-.^ .• __ . - i . - 

Coulters briga/le - ' 

was short, for the enemy, n^^w -ont, dank and rear, 

mostly thr- ' , ' ' ' 

battery w»r 

in their attempt to €*scape nt.^rthwar 



yfjriL — ' - state* that be 

SiriDjr rotLDCl ■-■ri <;i-- r-znt "i t rj.-- iiitiUtrT, and 1" " 

«ff tb»: fra^tuy"- e-'-a.p»- tluit way. A'- G^a. M 
th«^»; till aft- 

White ij&k Koad, oo ae to take part m. lae actMA. 
€ 



42 BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS. 

Immediately after the forks were gained I directed (xen, 
Crawford to change front again to the right, and march toward 
the sound of the tiring, so as again to take the enemy in flank 
and rear, and this he at once did. I also directed a cavalry 
brigade, M'hich had been kept mounted, and which now came 
rapidly along the Ford Road toward me, not to move along it 
further, but to tile to their left and proceed in the direction 
Gen. Crawford had taken. 

I then passed down the Ford Road, and on reaching the forks, 
turned to the right along the White Oak Road. The troops 
were joyous and tilled with enthusiasm at their success, but 
somewhat disorganized thereby and by their marching and 
fighting so long in the woods. On my arriving at the point 
E (see map), I found that our advance there was stayed by 
the enemy, who had formed a new line for their left flank near 
the position F, while they yet maintained their front against 
our cavalry on the south. Tliough the orders had been not to 
halt, and many officers were then urging their men forward, the 
disordered men not feeling the influence of their connnanders, 
continued to fire without advancing. 

Accompanied by Captain Benyaurd and the portion of my 
staff then present, I rode out to the front and called those near 
me to follow. This was innnediately responded to. Every- 
where along the front the color-bearers and oflicers sprang out, 
and, without more firing, our men advanced, capturing all the 
enemy remaining. 

During this last charge my horse was fatally shot within a 
fcAv paces of the line where the enemy made his last stand, an 
orderly by my side was killed, and Col. Richardson, of the 
Seventh AVisconsin, who sprang between me and the enemy, 
was severely wounded. 

I sent Gen. Bankhead, after the last of the enemy had been 
cai)tured, to Gen. Sheridan, to report the result and receive his 
instructions. He returned with the reply that my instructions 
had been sent me. At 7 }>. m. they reached me, and were as 
follows : 

"Major-Cicneral Warren, connuanding Fifth Army Corps, 



CONCLUSION. 43 

''is relieved fn.m duty, and will report at once tor orders to 
Lieut. -den. (irant, comnianding' annies U. S."" 

] at once asked of Gen, Sheridan an explanation of this 
order, but conld obtain none. 

The Fifth Corps, in this Itattle, captured 3,24-1: men, witli 
their arms, eleven reiiimental colors, and one four-unii battery 
with its caissons. 

It lost, in killed and wounded, (i^-t men, of which 800 were 
in Gen. Crawford's division, 2i):^ in Gen. Ayres' division, and 
125 in Gen. (4ritRn's division. Anioui;- these were several dis- 
tinguished otficei-s of hio-h promise. Their names will be duly 
recorded in the othcial I'eports. 

CONCLUSION. 

I believe there never was a previous ])eriod of my military 
life when the o])erations I have described would not have 
o-ained me the ])raise of my superior. I liave seen nearly all 
the princi])al officers of .my connnand, and all unite in telling 
me that they regard my treatnu^nt as unjust. Gen. Griffin as 
sured me he would so express himself at suitable o})portunity 
to (ren. Sheridan. Of the many expi-essi(jns of sympathy 1 
have received from mend)ers of my corps, the tollowing letter, 
sent me uns(»licite(l, but publislied here by ])ermission, \vritten 
by one of its most worthy officers — Col. T. V. IVFcCoy, of the 
One Hundred and Seventh Pennsylvania Volunteers — isgiveu 
as a type : 

" I had expected to have the pleasure of meeting you be- 
" fore retiring from the service, personally paying my respects, 
'• and bidding you a kind farewell ; but it was ordered other- 
" wise. A mere glimpse of you, as we jtassed through Peters- 
''burg on our march Xorth, was the last sight the Fifth Coi'ps 
"had of their beloved commander. I can nit»st truthfully as- 
" sure you of your great popularity with the Corps, both offi- 
" cers and men; and lean assure you further, that it was a 
"prevailing sentiment that it was a well-uu'rited popularity. 
" I speak tVeely and frankly. I can realize how gratifying it 
"is to a connnanding officer to know that he has the love and 
"respect of his men. . 



44 - CONCLUSION. 

" On tlie '2d of April, when it wa^^ known tliat you had 
*' been taken from n;^, tliere was mingled surprise, regret, and 
" fjloom. I have read and re-read, again and again. Gen. Sher- 
" idan's report of the battle of the Five Forks, and, in my 
''liumlde judgment, he utterly fails in justifying his conduct 
'' in your removal. Even if what is asserted were true, (which 
'' I do not believe), in view of your past valualde services to 
" the country, and more especially to your CV>rps, and you 
" in connnand, having, in a great measure, gained by its splen- 
" did conduct that afternoon, the most important victory of the 
"campaign; and while thanks and sliouts were going up to 
" Heaven f<:)r the great achievement, to relieve from his honored 
" command one of the priiicipal heroes was an act most strange 
" and no less astounding. This is merely the substance of what 
" has been in my mind, and which I would have been pleased 
" to have expressed to you personally, could I have met you at 
" any proper period since. I look back upon this battle of the 
" Five Forks with great interest, it being the turning point of 
'* tlie great movements from winch flowed so numy favorable 
'' and glorious results. Then, I have a more personal interest 
^' in it from the fact of my regiment conducting itself so well, 
"that I had the honor of receiving the thanks of Gen. Baxter 
" on the tield." 

It is a source of much regret to me that the suddenness of 
mv removal has prevented my taking an appropriate leave of 
my command, and thereby to express to them my warm wishes 
for their future, and my sympathy with them, ^^'hatever that 
future may be. 

I feel, too, that many to whom it would have been gratifying 
to carry with them to their homes my testimony of their sei*- 
vices have been deprived of it. So far as this can be remedied, 
I shall be glad to do. so yet. I also hope that those who may 
have been overlooked in the distribution of honors will write 
to me, and I will endeavor to promote their just claims as far 
as my endorsement can. 
I^o. 119 East Seventeenth Stkeet, 

Kew York City, December 10, 1865. 



A V P E N 1) I X 



T o-ive herein an appendix df all the antlioritativo t-oni- 
nuniications vet publir^hed on the battle of I"'i\c Fm-ks. 

LETTER FKOM GEN. WARKEN IN REGARD TO HIS 15E1XG KKLIEVED 
BY GEN. SHEKn)AN. 

Mississippi River, Tliursaay, May 11, 1865. 
To the Editors of the New York Times : 

I respectfullj' request the i)ul)lication m your paper of this communi- 
cation and accompanying letters relating to the battle of Five Forks. 

The only reason I have heard assignctl tor relieving me at that time were 
the sunnises of newspaper correspondents, which there is no authority for. 
But an unfriendly spirit toward me apparently dictated their sni)i)ositions, 
and they have done me much injustice. I was relieved only after the 
battle was over, and while at the head of my troops, and when not even a 
fugitive of the enemy was in sight. 

I personally sought of Gen. Sheridan a reason for his order; but he 
would not, or conld not, give one, and declinetl to do so. I obeyed the 
order to report to Gen. Grant that night, and was by him a.ssigned to the 
command of the defenses at City Point and Bermuda Hundred. After the 
evacuation of Richmond and Petersl)urg, I was given the command of 
the troops at the latter place and along the Southside Railroad belonging 
to the Army of the Potomac. When these troops were relieved by troops 
from the Anny of the James, I was left in Petersl)nrg a^wailing orders. 
I then addressed a letter (coi)y sent herewith), dated April Oth. to Gen. 
Rawlins, Chief of Staff, soliciting an investigation. On the 2:2d April, 1 
sent anotlier, requesting permission to publish the first one, for the reasons 
set forth therein (copy sent herewith). On the 2d ]\ray, I telegraphed Col. 
Bowers, Adjutant-General, to ascertain if these had been received, and he 
answered, they " were received, the latter during Gen. Grant's al)sence. 
Orders have been sent you (mej to report here, when you can see the 
General." 

On May 3d, I received by telegraph an extract from General Orders 
No. 78, of May 1, assigning me to the command of the Department of the 
Mississippi. I at once proceeded to Washington, and after a pci-s<mal 



46 APPEXDIX, 

interview with Gen. Grant, received, on the (ith of ]\[ay, an answer to my 
communications of tlie 9th and 22d April, authorizing my publishing 
them, and stating the reasons for not granting me the investigation sought. 
A copy of this letter is herewith sent. 

Having tlms exhausted my means of getting at the cause of my being 
relieved by Gen. Sheridan, I present the following brief account of the 
operations on tho 1st of April : 

The operations of the enemy on the 31st of March made it necessaiy 
for me to send a portion of my corps dui-ing the night to sui^ijort Gen. 
Sheridan's cavahy, which had been forced back to near Dinwiddie Court- 
house. One of my divisions was thus compelled to marcli all night, after 
having fought all day, and the rest of the corps moved toward the enemy 
that confronted the cavalry at daybreak. 

Our presence on the flank and rear of the enemy compelled him to fall 
back rapidly to the vicinity of the Five Forks, and Gen. Sheridan, on 
advancing with tlie cavalry, found him slightly intrenched j^here. This 
force proved to be a complete division of the enemy's infantry, and all the 
cavalry of Lee's army. 

I received an order from Gen. Meade, after joining Gen. Sheridan, to 
report to him for duty, which I did, and the corjjs was halted by his direc- 
tion at the point where we joined him, about 8 a. m. At 1 -p. m. I was 
directed to Ijring up the corps to Gravelly Run Church, a distance of about 
two and three-fourths miles from where they had been halted, and there 
form with two divisions in front and one in reserve, so as to move with 
the whole corps, and attack and turn the enemy's left flank on the White 
Oak Road. 

My line was formed accordingly. Ayres on the left, in three lines of jjattle ; 
Cra^^ord on the right, in thi*ee lines of battle; and Griffin's Division'in 
reserve in masses. This occupied tDl 4 p. m. The forward movement then 
began. Gen. Ayres' Division became first engaged, wheeling to the left, 
ti'om iiiciug north to facing west as it advanced. Gen. Cra^rford's Divi- 
sion also wheeled to the left on Gen. Ayres' as a jiivot, but owing to the 
nature of the ground and forests, and the greater distance to gain, he lost 
his connection with Gen. Aj-res. 

Into the interval thus left Gen. Griffin's Division was placed. These two 
divisions steadily drove in the enemy's left flank. Gen. Crawford's Division 
moved on westward till it gained the road leading north from the center 
of the enemy's position, when it was wheeled to the south, and attacked 
the troops that were endeavoring to hold this road as an outlet for 
escape. 

All the divisions now closed in upon the enemy, capturing the artillery 
that was attempting to move north, and nearly all the infantiy, which their 
movements had thrown in the greatest confusion. I successively followed 
the operations of my divisions from left to right, being with Gen. Cra^vford 
when the i)osition was taken. 



APPENDIX. 47 

While these movements above desciibecl were gouig on, the cavalry 
engaged the enemy along his whole front, which was facing south. The 
enemy still maintained the right of his line, confronting the cavalry, after 
we had swept away his left and center ; l)nt the Fifth Coips crowding 
along the line without Avaiting to reform, cajjtured all who remained as it 
swept along. 

I was with the extreme advance in the last movement, and was relieved 
while there at 7 p. m., the battle being then over, -and not even a fugitive 
enemy in sight. 

The following are copies of the letters herein referred to. 
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

G. K. AVARREN, Maj.-Gen. Vols. 



GEX. WAKKEX TO COL. BOWEKS. 

Petersburg, April 22, 18G5. 
To Go?. T. S. Bowers, A. G., 

HeuiJqtiarten Annies of United Stofes : 
Colonel : I beg leave forward a co])y of comnnmication addressed to 
Headquarters Armies United States, on the Dtli instant, with the re- 
quest to be allowed to jniblish the same. This will relieve me and my 
friends from an unpleasant relation to the public, will answer many letters 
daily received, and will prevent my silence being an injury to me. I can 
then patiently await the investigation that I do not doubt will in due 
time be accorded to me. 

Vci7 respectfully, your obedient servant, 

G. K. WARREN, Mojor-Gcn. Vols. 



REQUEST FOR AX IXVESTIOATIOX. 

Petersburg, April 0, ISfio. 
ToBrig.-Gen. J. A. Rawlins, ChifJ" Stuff, 

Head quo rters Armies of United ,S("tes : 
Genend : The order of Gen. Sheriilan taking from me the connnand of 
my corps on the evening of the 1st of Aj^ril, after the victory was won, 
assigns no cause, and leaves me open to the inferences now finding 
expression in the i)ublic prints, and which arc in every way to my 
])rejuilicc. 

I am unconscious of having done anything improper or uiiliecDniiug 
to my position, or the cliaraeter of a soldier, or neglected any order or 
duty. 

I therefore respectfully recjuest a full investigation of the matter as soon 
as the exigencies of the service will admit. 

I make this application now while awaiting orders, wliii'h I deem the 
most approi)riate time ; but I do not intend nor desh-e to press the matter 



48 appendix/ 

upon the consideration of the Lieutenant-General until he can give it his 
attention without interfering with more important duties. Tlie regard 
already shown me, in immediately assig-ning to me another command on 
the 2d inst., gives me the assurance that he w-ill not deem it an intrusion 
to solicit an opportunity to vindicate the honor and reputation of a faith- 
ful soldier of the Union, who waits in silence under an unmerited injury, 
till such time as his superior shall be ready to give him a hearing. 
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

'^ ^ G. K. WARREN, Major- Gen. Vols. 



GEN. GRANT S REPLY. 

Headquarters Armies op the United States, ) 
Washington, May 6, 1865. \ 

To Major-Geneml G. K. Warren : 

General : Your note, requesting authority to publish your application 
for an investigation of the grounds upon which you were relieved from 
the command of the Fifth x\rmy Corps, or to have the investigation, is 
received. 

It is impossible at this time to give the court and witnesses necessary 
for the investigation, but I see nothing in your application objectionable 
to have published. 

Very respectfully, your oliedient servant, 

U. S. GRANT, Lientena lit- General. 

The following report, it will be perceived, contradicts no 
statement of my letter of May lltli : 

EEPOET OF MAJOR-GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

Cavalry Headquarters, May 16, 1865. 
General : I have the honor to submit the following narrative of the 
operations of my cpmmand during the recent campaign in front of Peters- 
burg and Richmond, terminating with the surrender of the rebel army 
of Northern Virginia, at Appommattox Court-house, Virginia, on April 9, 
1865 : 

^ :i! :K * * 

During the night of the 3ist of March, my headquarter were at Din- 
widdle Court-house, and the Lieutenant-General notified me that the Fifth 
Coq3s would rei)ort to me, and should reach mc aliout midnight. This 
coqjs had l)een oflered me on the oOth instant ; but very muck desiring 
the Sixth Corps, which had been Avith me in tlie Shenandoah Valley, I 
asked for it, but on account of the delay which would occur in moving 
that corps from its position in the lines in front of Petersburg, it could 
not be sent to me. I respectfully submit herewith my brief accounts of the 



APPENDIX. 49 

operations of the day. the response to which was the ordering: of the Fifth 
Corps to my support and my command, as also the dispatch from the 
Lieutenant-Gcneral notifyinir me of his action. I understood that the 
Fifth Corps, ^vhcn onU-re.l t.) report to uic. was in position near S. 
Dahney's house, in the an-rle l)et\vecn the Roydton Road and the Five 
Forks Road. 

Had Gen. Warren moveil according- to tlie expectations of the 
Lieutenant-Gcneral. there would appear to have heen but little chance for 
the escape of the enemy's infantry in front of Dinwiddie Court-house. 
Ayres' Division moved down the Boydton Plank-road durinir the night, 
and in the morning moved west rin R. Boiseau's house, strikinir the Five 
Forks Road about two and a half n\iles north of Dinwidtlie Court-house. 
Gen. Warren, with Grithn's and Crawford's Divisions, moved down the 
road by Crump's house, coming into the Five Forks Road near J. Bois- 
seau's house between 7 and 8 o'clock on the morning of the 1st of April. 
Meantime, I moved my cavalry force at daylight against the enemy's lines 
in front, which gave way rai)idly. moving ofl'liy the right flank and cross- 
ing Chamberlain's Creek. This hasty movement was accelerated by the 
discovery that two divisions of the Fifth Corps were in their rear and that 
one division Avas moving toward their left and rear. * 

The following were the instructions sent to Gen. Warren : 

C.vv VI. KY 1Iead(Jvakti:i;s. Dixwiddie CorRT-iiorsE. ) 
April 1. 18Uo, o a. m. \ 

To Major- Gnu ml Warkex, 

Comminiilutij Fifth Anny Corps : 
I am holding in front of Dinwiddle Court-house, on the road leading 
to Five Forks, for three-quarters of a mile, with General Custer's Division. 
The enemy are in his immediate front, lying so as to cover the road just 
this side of A. Adams' house, which leads out across Chamberlain's Bed or 
Run. I understand you have a division at J. Boiseau's: if so. you are in 
rear of the enemy's line, and almost on his flanks. I will hold on here. 
Possibly they may attack Custer at daylight ; if so, attack instantly and 
in full force. Attack at daylight any how. and I will make an eft'ort to 
get the road this side of xidams' house : and if I do. you can capture the 
whole of them. Any force moving down the road I am holding, or on the 
"White Oak Road, will be in the enemy's rear, and, in all probability, get 
any force that may escape you by a flank attack. Do not fear my leaving 
here. If the enemy remains. I shall tight at daylight. 

P. II. SHERIDAN. M./jor-Genernl 

As they fell baik, the enemy were rapidly followed ))y General "Mcrritt's 
two divisions. General Devin on the right and General Custer on the left. 
General Crook in the rear. Durini;- the remainder of the day. General 
Crook's Division held the extreme left and rear, and was not •seriously 
engaged. 

7 



50 APPENDIX. 

I then detemiined that I wouhl drive the enemy, with the cavahr, to 
the Five Forks, press them inside of theii* works, and make a feint to turn 
their right flank ; and, meanwhile, quietly move up the Fifth Corps, t\ith 
a view to attacking their left flank, crush the whole force, if possible, and 
drive westward those who might escape, thus isolating them from their 
army at Petersburg. Happily, this conception was successfully executed. 
About this time. General McKenzie's Division of Cavalry, from the Army 
of the James, reported to me, and consisted of about 1,000 effective men. 
I directed General Warren to hold fast at J. Boiseau's house, refresh his 
men, and be ready to move to the fi'ont when required ; and General 
McKenzie was ordered to rest in front of Dinwiddie Court-house until 
further orders. 

^Meantime, General Merritt's command continued to press the enemy, 
and, by impetuous charges, drove them from two lines of temporary works; 
General Custer guiding his advance on the widow Gilliam's house, and 
General Devin on the main Five Forks Koad. The courage displayed by 
the cavalry officers and men was superb, and about 2 o'clock the enemy 
was behind his works on the White Oak Road, and his skirmish line 
drawn in. I then ordered up the Fifth Corps on the main road, and sent 
Brevet Major Gillespie, of the Engineers, to turn the head of the columil 
off on the Gravelly Chujch Road, and put the corjjs in jjosition on this 
road, obliquely to and at a point but a short distance from the White Oak 
road, and about one mile from the Five Forks. Two divisions of the corps 
were to form the front Ime, and one division was to be held in reserve, in 
columns of regiments, opposite the centre. 

I then directed General Merritt to demonstrate as though he was at- 
tempting to turn the enemy's right flank, and notified that the Fifth 
Corps would strike the enemy's left flank, and ordered that the cavalry 
should assault the enemy's works as soon as the Fifth Corps became en- 
gaged, and that would be determined by the volleys of musketry. I then 
rode over to where the Fifth Corps was going into jiosition, and found 
them coming up vei'y slowly. I was exceedingly anxious to attack at once, 
for the sun was getting low, and we had to fight or go back. It was no 
place to intrench, and it would have been shameful to have gone back 
with no results to conn^ensate for the loss of the brave men who had fallen 
during the day. In this connection, I will say that General Warren did not 
exert himself to get up his coi-j)s as rapidly as he might have done ; and his 
manner gave me the impression that he wished the sun to go down before 
dispositions for the attack could be completed. As soon as the corps was 
in position, I ordered an advance in the following formation : Ayres' Divi- 
sion on the left, in double lines ; Crawford's Division on the right, in double 
lines ; and Griffin's Division in reserve, behind Crawford ; and the White 
Oak Road w*as reached without opposition. 

While General Warren was getting into position, I learned that the 



APPENDIX. 51 

lei't of the Second Coii>s of the Army of the Potomac, on my right, had 
been swung around from the dh-ection of its line of battle until it fronted 
on the Boydton Road, and parallel to it, which otfered an opi^ortunity to 
the enemy to march down the White Oak Road and attack me in right 
and rear. General ]McKenzie was therefore sent np the Camp Road, with 
dii-ections to gain the White Oak Road, if possible ; but to attack at all 
hazards any enemy found, and, if successful, then march down the road 
and join me. General McKenzie executed this with courage and skill, at- 
tacking a force of the enemy on the White Oak Road, and driving it 
toward Peterslmrg. He then countermarched, and joined me on the 
White Oak Road just as the Fifth Cor])s advanced to the attack, and I 
directed him to swing round with the right of the infantry and gain pos- 
session of the Ford Road at the crossing of Hatcher's Run. The Fifth 
Corps, on reaching the Wliite Oak Road, made a left wheel, and burst on 
the enemy's left flank and rear like a tornado, and pushed I'apidly on, 
orders having been given that, if the enemy Avas routed, there should be no 
halt to reform broken lines. As stated l)eforc. the firing of the Fifth Coqis 
was the signal to Gen. 31crrltt to assault, which was promptly res])onded 
to, and the works of the enemy were soon carried at several points by our 
brave cavalrymen. The enemy were driven from their strong line of works 
and completely routed, the Fifth Corps doubling up their left flank in con- 
fusion, and the cavalry of Gen. ilerritt dashing on to the White Oak Road, 
capturing their artillery and turning it upon them; and riding into their 
broken ranks so demoralized them that they made no sciious stand after 
their line was carried, but took to flight in disorder. Between 5,000 and 
6,000 prisoners fell into our hands, and the fugitives were driven westward, 
and were pursued until long after dark by >[erritt"s and ]\[cKenzie"s cavalry 
for a distance of six miles. 

During this attack I again became dissatisfied with General Warren. 
During the engagement portions of his line gave way, when not exposed 
to a heavy fire, and simply for want of confidence on the part of the troops, 
which General Warren did not exert himself to inspire. I therefore relieved 
him from the command of the Fifth Cori)s, authority for this action having 
been sent to me before the Ijattle. unsolicited. When the pursuit was given 
up, I directed General Griftin, avIio had been ordered to assiunc command 
of the Fifth Corps, to collect his troops at once, march two divisions back 
to Gravelly Church, and put them into position at right angles to the 
White Oak Road, facing toward Petersburg, while Bartlett's Division, 
Griffin's old, covered the Ford Road to Hatcher's Run. (General Merritt's 
cavalry went into camp on the widow Gilliam's plantation, and General 
McKenzie took position on the Ford Road at the crossing of Hatchers 
Run. I camiot speak too highly of the conduct of the troops in this 
battle, and of the gallantry of their commanding ollicers, who ap- 
peared to realize that the success of the campaiga and fate of Lee's 



02 APPENniX. 

army depended upon it. They merit the thanks of the country and 
reward of the Government. To Generals Griffin, Ayres, Bartlett, and 
Cra^vford, of the Fifth Corps, and to Generals Merritt, Custer, Devin, and 
McKenzie, of the cavalry, great credit is due ; and to their subordhiate 
commanders they will undoulitedly award the praise which is due to them 
for the hearty co-operation, bravery, and ability w^hich were everywhere 
displayed. 

I am. Sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

P. H. SHERIDAN, Major-General 
Brevet Major- General John A. Rawlins, 

.Chie/qfSta^f. 



Cavalry Headquarters, Dinwiddie C. H., ) 
March 31, 1865. \ 

Lierdenaat-Ot neral Grant, 

Commanding Armies United States: 

Tiie enemy's cavalry attacked me about 10 o'clock to-day, on the road 
coming in from the west, and a little north of Dinwiddie C. H. This attack 
w^as very handsomely repulsed by Gen. Smith's Brigade of Crook's Divi- 
sion, and the enemy v;as driven across Chamberlain Creek. Shortly after- 
ward, the enemy's infantry attacked on the same Creek in heavy force, and 
drove in Gen. Davies' Brigade, and, advancing rapidly, gained the forks 
of the road at J. Boiseau's. This forced Devin, who was in advance, and 
Davies, to cross to the Boydton Road. Gen. Gregg's Brigade and Gen. 
Gibbs', who had been toward Dinwiddie, then attacked the enemy in the 
rear very handsomely. This stopj^ed the march toward the left of our 
infantry, and finally caused them to turn toward Dinmddie and attack us 
in heavy force. The enemy then again attacked at Chamberlain's Creek, 
and forced Smith's position. At this time Capehart and Pennington's 
brigades of Caster's Division came up, and a very handsome fight 
occurred. 

The enemy have gained some ground, but we still hold in front of Din- 
widdie C. II., and Davies and Devin are coming down the Boydton Road 
to join us. 

The opposing force was Pickett's Division, Wise's Indei^endent Brig- 
ade of Infantry, and Fitzhugh Lee's, Rossers, aijd W. H. Lee's Cavalry 
commands. 

The meu behaved sjjleudidly. Our loss in killed and wounded will 
probably number four hundred and fifty men; very few were lost as 
lirisoners. 



APPENDIX. 53 

We have of the enemy a nuniher of prisoners. This force is too strong 
for us. I will hold out to Dinwiddie (". [I. until I am eomix'llcil to 
leave. 

Our lighting to-day was all dismounted. 

P. H. SHERIDAN. Major- Genera}. 



Dabney Mills, March 81, IROn, 10.05 p. m. 
Major- General Sheridan : 

The Fifth Coii^s has been ordered to your support. Two divisions 
will go by J. Boiseau's, and one down the Boydton Road. In addition to 
this, I have sent jNIcKenzie's Cavalry, which will reach you by the Vaughau 
Road. 

All these forces, except the cavalry, should reach you by Vl to-night. 

You will assume command of the whole force sent to operate with you, 
and use it, to the best of your al)ility, to destroy the force which your 
command has fought so gallantly to-day. 

U. S. GRANT, Lleutenant-General 



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